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IF YOUR GRANDFATHER COULD
POLLUTE, SO CAN YOU:
ENVIRONMENTAL "GRANDFATHER
CLAUSES" AND THEIR ROLE IN
ENVIRONMENTAL INEQUITY
Heidi Gorovitz Robertson*
I. INTRODUCTION: ENVIRONMENTAL GRANDFATHER CLAUSES AND
ENVIRONMENTAL INEQUITY
When this country was struggling over voting rights, it adopted what
are now called "grandfather clauses" to exclude certain groups from the
democratic process.' Although various types of laws excluded people
from voting,2 a man could vote if his grandfather had been allowed to
vote.3 Almost by definition, this excluded all black Americans, slave or
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1. The New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary defines "grandfather clause" as "a
legislative clause exempting certain pre-existing classes of people or things from the re-
quirements of a regulation." 1 THE NEW SHORTER OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 1130
(3d ed. 1993). Between 1890 and 1910, 12 states enacted laws that, although they did not
mention race, were used to prevent non-whites from voting. " '[G]randfather clause[s]'
stipulat[ed] that no lineal descendent of any person qualified to vote on January 1, 1866,
should be denied the right to vote." Karen McGill Arrington, The Struggle to Gain the
Right to Vote, in VOTING RIGHTS IN AMERICA: CONTINUING THE QUEST FOR FULL PAR-
TICIPATION 30 (Karen McGill Arrington & William L. Taylor eds., 1992) [hereinafter VOT-
ING RIGHTS]; see also LANI GUINIER, THE TYRANNY OF THE MAJORITY 8 (1994).
2. Some of these laws required that a prospective voter pass a literacy test which
excluded many non-whites from the voting process. VOTING RIGHTS, supra note 1, at 30.
Even illiterate prospective voters, however, could vote if they qualified under a grandfa-
ther clause. Id. Other examples of exclusionary laws are those that imposed poll taxes as a
prerequisite to voting rights. Id.
3. Clearly, "grandfather clauses" also discriminated against women, who could not
vote consistently in this country until ratification of the Nineteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution. Although Congress passed the Nineteenth Amendment on
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free, and anyone whose grandfather had not lived in this country.4 Just as
grandfather clauses were discriminatory as applied to the voting laws in
the nineteenth century,5 modem grandfather clause-like provisions have
a similarly discriminatory impact in environmental laws today. Applied
to modem environmental laws, a grandfather clause, in essence, says, "if
your grandfather could pollute, so can you." 6
Grandfather clauses are common in the laws of this country. "In con-
gressional jargon, a grandfather clause lets somebody who's already
doing something keep doing it after Congress decrees it shouldn't be
done anymore." 7 As such, when a tough new law is proposed, affected
industry lobbyists fight, often successfully, to exempt the existing industry
from the new, presumably more stringent requirements. This is true, for
June 4, 1919, the states did not fully ratify it until August 26, 1920. VOTING RIGHTS, supra
note 1, at 32.
4. Id. at 30. "Grandfather clauses" exempted from rigid economic and literacy re-
quirements those persons eligible to vote on January 1, 1866 and their descendants. This
effectively barred all black Americans from the polls. The term is now applied more gen-
erally, to any kind of legal exemption based on prior status. CONCISE COLUMBIA ENCY-
CLOPEDIA 352 (3d ed. 1994); see also FRANCES Fox PIVEN & RICHARD A. CLOWARD,
WHY AMERICANS DON'T VOTE 6 (1988) (recognizing the disenfranchisement of blacks and
the poor at the beginning of the twentieth century).
5. With respect to voting rights, the Supreme Court ruled "grandfather clauses" un-
constitutional in 1915. Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347 (1915). In Guinn, the
Supreme Court invalidated, under the 15th Amendment, an Oklahoma statute that im-
posed a literacy requirement on voters but contained a "grandfather clause" applicable to
individuals and their lineal descendants entitled to vote on (or prior to) January 1, 1866.
Id. at 362-68.
The judiciary has been called the most receptive branch of the U.S. government with
respect to fostering the Civil War amendments. Charles V. Hamilton, The Civil War
Amendments: The Second Constitution and the Evolving Political Struggle, in VOTING
RIGHTS, supra note 1, at 79, 83. One major manifestation of this role is its overturning of
the "grandfather clause" provisions that disenfranchised Americans who should have
benefitted from the substantive rights the Civil War amendments provided. Id.
6. It actually might be more accurate, in the modem environmental example, to say
"if you are a grandfather, you can pollute," because the environmental clauses apply to
old, existing facilities, not to lineal descendants or any other "human" characteristic.
7. Jerry Knight, Legislators to Load Bank Bill With 'Special' Amendments, WASH.
POST, July 4, 1991, at B9.
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example, in banking,8 taxation,9 food and drug law,1" interior design,11
Medicaid, 2 Congress' self-regulation,13 and baseball, 4 as well as in envi-
ronmental law. Grandfather clauses are even used in high-level interna-
tional negotiations.' 5
8. One "grandfather clause" under Virginia banking law allows a few Virginia banks
to operate insurance divisions if they were doing so by the early 1970s. The law, however,
barred other Virginia banks not involved in the insurance business at that time from selling
insurance. See First Virginia Bank Acquires Fairfax Insurance Agency, WASH. POST, Aug.
12, 1991, at Wash. Bus. 7.
9. See, e.g., Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085 (1986). The
Tax Reform Act of 1986 provides two methods for reporting a lump-sum distribution. Per-
sons meeting an age requirement may choose the better of the two forms. Persons allowed
to make this choice, by virtue of a "grandfather clause" are those who were 50 years old on
January 1, 1986, or at least 59 1/2 in 1987. Id. § 1122(h)(3)(C)(i), 100 Stat. at 2471. The
choice for how to report a lump sum distribution "appl[ies] to any lump sum distribution
... received by an individual who has attained age 50 before Jan. 1, 1986." Id.; see also
E.M. Abramson, IRS Again Postpones Mandatory IRA Withdrawal Requirement, WASH.
POST, Jan. 26, 1987, at Wash. Bus. 53 (discussed in a financial question and answer column).
10. The Food and Drug Administration, until recently, could not regulate silicone
breast implant devices because they were introduced in 1962, and thus protected from
FDA regulation under a "grandfather clause." Malcolm Gladwell, FDA Set To Begin
Hearings On Silicone Breast Implants, WASH. POST, Feb. 17, 1992, at A1, A6. This clause
allowed companies to continue to sell existing devices. Id. at A6. Despite the grandfather
clause, the FDA could ask for product safety data whenever it desired, and in the case of
silicone breast implants, the FDA did not ask for this information until 1990. Id.; see 58
Fed. Reg. 3436 (1993).
11. Todd J. Gillman, Architects Fight D.C. Law Licensing Interior Designers, WASH.
POST, Aug. 24, 1987, at Wash. Bus. 1, 25.
12. "Grandfather clauses" in the Medicaid law allowed states a grace period to con-
tinue several creative budgeting and accounting techniques that allowed them to qualify
for additional Medicaid matching funds. Dan Morgan, Medicaid Loopholes Closing For
Strapped States, WASH. POST, Feb. 7, 1993, at A23.
13. 2 U.S.C. § 439a (1988). In 1979, Congress passed an amendment to the Federal
Election Campaign Act that prohibited anyone not a Senator or Representative on Janu-
ary 8, 1980 from converting campaign contributions to any personal use. Id. In other
words, those who passed the amendment's test exempted, or grandfathered, themselves
out of the Act's requirements and could, therefore, legally convert campaign contributions
to personal use. Andy Zipper, The Spoils of Office, BARRONS, Sept. 28, 1992, at 8. In
1989, however, Congress eliminated the grandfather clause. Ethics Reform Act, Pub. L.
No. 101-194, § 504(a), 103 Stat. 1716, 1755 (1989).
14. Even the Major League Players Association has tried to make use of "grandfather
clauses" to protect the incomes of its players. The league owners, after seeking to institute
a salary cap, proposed to phase in a salary cap in a way that "grandfathers" players cur-
rently in Major League Baseball. Richard Justice, Baseball Closer To A Strike, WASH.
POST, June 9, 1994, at D1, D7.
15. While negotiating an arms reduction treaty with Mikhail Gorbachev in 1990, then
Secretary of State James Baker turned to Mr. Gorbachev and said: " 'You got a deal and
we close ALCMs, provided Tacit Rainbow is grandfathered.' " Lewis H. Diuguid, Declar-
ing War On Plain English, WASH. POST, Sept. 2, 1990, at B2. Mr. Baker was seeking to
exempt "Tacit Rainbow", a now-defunct Pentagon weapons program, from the agreement.
Id.
Catholic University Law Review
In the environmental arena, these laws make it much easier for compa-
nies or municipalities to expand older, existing facilities than to create
new ones. 16 They also make it significantly more difficult for opponents
to shut down an existing facility than to block the siting or construction of
a new one.17 But most troubling for the environmental justice move-
ment, which in part seeks to distribute environmental risk more equita-
bly, grandfather clauses make it difficult to reduce the risk presented by
polluting facilities currently located in low-income minority
communities. 18
By "environmental grandfather clause", this Article refers to all envi-
ronmental law provisions or principles that create virtual "safe havens"
for existing polluting facilities by exempting them from the stringent envi-
ronmental standards applicable to new facilities. Although usually not
explicitly called grandfather clauses,19 some provisions in the environ-
mental laws work like the voting rights grandfather clauses in the late
nineteenth century,-protecting something because it existed at an earlier
date. Because some polluting facilities were already constructed or oper-
ational at the time of enactment of certain environmental provisions,
grandfather clauses exempt them from the requirements of the
enactment.
Environmental grandfather clauses make it easier, and legal, for ex-
isting facilities to pollute at higher, more dangerous levels than newer
16. Michael B. Gerrard, Fear and Loathing in the Siting of Hazardous and Radioactive
Waste Facilities: A Comprehensive Approach to a Misperceived Crisis, 68 TUL. L. REv.
1047, 1100 (1994) (internal citations omitted).
17. Id.
18. Robert D. Bullard, The Threat of Environmental Racism, NAT. RESOURCES &
ENV'T, Winter 1993, at 23. This Article assumes that the environmental justice move-
ment's goal in attempting to distribute environmental risk more equitably is not merely to
move polluters to other neighborhoods, but also to reduce overall environmental risk, and
in doing so, to make the level of risk to which low-income communities are exposed more
similar to that to which non-minority communities are exposed. Id. This Article will not
attempt to address all of the potential solutions to the problem of grandfather clauses.
Administrative solutions may be a topic for a later Article, but are beyond the scope of this
one.
19. Environmental grandfather clauses are not referred to as such within the environ-
mental statutes and are rarely referred to as such elsewhere. But see, e.g., Idaho Dept. of
Health and Welfare v. United States Dept. of Energy, 959 F.2d 149, 150, 152 (9th Cir.
1992); Vineland Chem. Co., Inc. v. Environmental Protection Agency, 810 F.2d 402, 404
(3d Cir. 1987); Environmental Protection Agency v. Environmental Waste Control, Inc.,
710 F. Supp. 1172, 1182 (N.D. Ind. 1989); General Motors Corp. v. Dept. of Natural Re-
sources, 472 N.W.2d 49, 51 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991); Fletcher Gravel Co., Inc. v. Jorling, 583
N.Y.S.2d 329, 331 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992), in which courts refer to various provisions within
environmental laws as "grandfather clauses" or to facilities benefiting from these provi-
sions as "grandfathered facilities."
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facilities.2" Older facilities may also continue to operate in their existing
locations, even where current siting regulations would not allow them to
locate there if they were new.2 ' In fact, "EPA found that about seventy
percent of all land-based [hazardous waste] treatment, storage, and dispo-
sal facilities would fail the EPA's current siting criteria for protecting
groundwater. '22 By allowing older facilities to operate under less strin-
gent environmental regulation, environmental grandfather clauses sub-
stantially hamper communities located near existing facilities in their
attempts to improve environmental quality in their neighborhoods.
Sociologists, lawyers, scientists, and the general public have begun to
notice that hazardous waste generating facilities, hazardous waste land-
fills, hazardous waste incinerators and many other major sources of pollu-
tion and environmental risk are located disproportionately in low-income
communities. 23 Studies have also shown that of the low-income neigh-
borhoods chosen as sites for polluting facilities, low-income neighbor-
hoods of Hispanics and African-Americans are chosen most frequently.24
20. See Gerrard, supra note 16, at 1100.
21. Id. at 1099. For example, Radiac Research Corp., a commercial hazardous and
low-level radioactive waste facility, has been located at the same site for many years. The
area is now a largely residential area in Brooklyn, New York. But, because the facility has
been located and operating there for so long, it is allowed to remain there and to continue
to operate. See id.; see also infra notes 111-22 and accompanying text (giving examples of
grandfathered sites).
22. Gerrard, supra note 16, at 1099 (internal citations omitted).
23. Id. at 1125-31; see also Richard J. Lazarus, Pursuing "Environmental Justice": The
Distributional Effects of Environmental Protection, 87 Nw. U. L. REV. 787, 796, 801 (1993);
Paul Mohai & Bunyan Bryant, Environmental Injustice: Weighing Race and Class as Fac-
tors in the Distribution of Environmental Hazards, 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 921, 923 (1992).
24. This point is somewhat controversial and has been debated in several fora. See,
e.g., U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, SITING OF HAZARDOUS WASTE LANDFILLS AND
THEIR CORRELATION WITH RACIAL AND ECONOMIC STATUS OF SURROUNDING COMMUNI-
TIES 1, 3 (1983) [hereinafter GAO REPORT] (stating that of the four offsite hazardous
waste landfills in the Southeast, African-Americans make up the majority in three of the
communities); COMMISSION FOR RACIAL JUSTICE, UNITED CHURCH OF CHRIST, TOXIC
WASTES AND RACE IN THE UNITED STATES Xiii (1987) [hereinafter UCC REPORT] (recog-
nizing that race is a significant factor in the location of hazardous waste facilities); Robert
D. Bullard, Solid Waste Sites and the Black Houston Community, 53 Soc. INQUIRY 273
(1983) [hereinafter Solid Waste Sites]; ROBERT D. BULLARD, DUMPING IN DIXIE: RACE,
CLASS, AND ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY (1990); see also Vicki Been, What's Fairness Got to
Do With It? Environmental Justice and the Siting of Locally Undesirable Land Uses, 78
CORNELL L. REV. 1001, 1009-10 (1993).
Robert Bullard's original study, in 1978, was the first extensive research connecting envi-
ronmental hazard to race. Bullard studied Houston's state permitted landfills and found
that five of the six facilities were located in African-American neighborhoods. Solid Waste
Sites, supra, at 281-82. The GAO Report found that three of the four major hazardous
waste landfills in the South were located in predominantly African-American communities,
well below the poverty line. GAO REPORT, supra, at 1. The study that resulted in the
UCC Report was a nationwide study of the distribution of hazardous waste sites to deter-
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Moreover, studies have also confirmed that a substantial disparity exists
between the federal government's diligence in environmental enforce-
ment and cleanup in minority communities2 5 as compared to its efforts in
non-minority communities.26  Specifically, government officials impose
mine whether the pattern unearthed in the GAO Report was true nationwide. UCC RE-
PORT, supra, at xii. The UCC Report found that race is the single best predictor of where
commercial hazardous waste facilities will be located, and asserts that it is virtually impos-
sible that this occurs by chance. Id. at xiii; see also Mohai & Bryant, supra note 23, at 927.
The Mohai and Bryant study showed that, in the Detroit area, members of racial minority
groups are four times more likely to live in close proximity to a commercial hazardous
waste facility than are caucasian people. Id. Like the UCC Report, Mohai and Bryant
tested for predictors of powerlessness, such as race, low-income and housing cost, and
found that race best predicted proximity to an environmental hazard. Id. at 923-25.
Vicki Been has argued that these studies did not provide an accurate picture of where
hazardous waste facilities are actually sited or how their sites were chosen. Vicki Been,
Locally Undesirable Land Uses in Minority Neighborhoods: Disproportionate Siting or
Market Dynamics?, 103 YALE L. J. 1383, 1384 n.2 (1994) [hereinafter Disproportionate
Siting]. She writes that the previous studies and literature addressing this problem are
simplistic because they assume that a siting pattern is disproportionate whenever the per-
centage of people of color in a host community is higher than the percentage of people of
color in the nation's population or in the population of non-host communities. Id. She
argues that the Bullard study, and others, do not show "that the host communities were
disproportionately minority or poor at the time the [waste] sites were selected." Id. at
1384.
The major studies concluding that siting decisions were at worst discriminatory, but at
least racially disproportionate are bolstered by a number of local studies reaching the same
conclusions. See id. at 1393 n.40 (citing numerous local studies reaching similar
conclusions).
Two recently released studies challenge previous claims of race-based industry siting de-
cisions. One study concluded that commercial hazardous waste treatment facilities are
more likely to be sited in working-class white neighborhoods than in minority communi-
ties. Douglas L. Anderton et al., Environmental Equity: The Demographics of Dumping,
in DEMOGRAPHY, May, 1994, at 229. The second study claims that research does not sup-
port claims of discriminatory industrial siting policies. CHRISTOPHER BOERNER & THOMAS
LAMBERT, ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE? 4-6 (Center for the Study of American Business,
Policy Study No. 121, 1994).
25. By "minority" community, this Article refers to communities of racial minority
groups, specifically, those in which Hispanics and/or African Americans are the predomi-
nant racial group. See CLEAN SITES, INC. HAZARDOUS WASTE SITES AND THE RURAL
POOR: A PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT vi (1990) [hereinafter "CLEAN SITES"]; UCC RE-
PORT, supra note 24, at xiv; see also Patricia J. Williams, Alchemical Notes: Reconstructing
Ideals From Deconstructed Rights, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 401, 404 n.4 (1987) (dis-
cussing problems with the term 'minority' as used to refer to African-American, Hispanic
and other groups of people of color).
26. Marianne Lavelle & Marcia Coyle, Unequal Protection: The Racial Divide in Envi-
ronmental Law, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 21, 1992, at S2; see also CLEAN SITES, supra note 25, at
50-51 (concluding that hazardous waste sites in rural counties were more likely to be cle-
aned up than those in other counties, but failing to address the racial variable in the analy-
sis); Lazarus, supra note 23, at 818-19; Rae Zimmerman, Social Equity and Environmental
Risk, 13 RISK ANALYSIS 649, 649, 664 (1993) (finding that with respect to inactive hazard-
ous waste disposal sites on the NPL, communities with relatively higher percentages of
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higher penalties on violators of environmental regulations when the vio-
lations occur in non-minority communities than when similar violations
occur in minority neighborhoods.27
The fact that low-income minority communities host a disproportionate
number of polluting facilities suggests that these communities also bear a
disproportionate burden of the environmental risk that accompanies
those facilities.28 Environmental justice 29 advocates have attempted to
remedy this apparent disparate distribution of environmental risk, pri-
marily by bringing lawsuits to block the construction of new polluting
facilities in low-income, minority communities.30 Groups have brought
racial minority populations have fewer clean up plans than other communities with NPL
sites); but see John A. Hird, Environmental Policy and Equity: The Case of Superfund, 12 J.
POL'Y ANALYSIS & MGMT 323, 337 (1993) (finding no relationship between the speed with
which sites are cleaned up and the host county's socioeconomic or racial characteristics);
Georgia: State Report Looks at Waste Site Fines, Finds No Discrimination in Minority Ar-
eas, 24 ENV'T REP. (BNA) No. 6, at 284 (June 11, 1993).
27. Lavelle & Coyle, supra note 26, at S2. This point is critical to the problem of
inequitable distribution of environmental risk. Although this Article focuses on the role of
the legislative tool of grandfather clauses, equity in enforcement could substantially reduce
the current inequities in environmental risk.
28. Marianne Lavelle, An Industrial Legacy, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 21, 1992, at S3 (discuss-
ing the health effects of pollution of an African-American community on Chicago's South
Side). Studies have shown that the effects of any disproportionate exposure to environ-
mental risk suffered by minority communities would be exacerbated by the substandard
health care, poor eating habits, hazardous occupations, and high consumption of cigarettes,
alcohol and illegal drugs found in those communities. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
AGENCY, ENVIRONMENTAL EoUITY: REDUCING RISK FOR ALL COMMUNITIES 11 (1992);
Regina Austin & Michael Schill, Black, Brown, Poor & Poisoned: Minority Grassroots En-
vironmentalism and the Quest for Eco-Justice, 1 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 69, 76-77 (1991).
29. This Article uses the term "environmental justice" to refer to the movement that
seeks to remedy the disproportionate burden of environmental risk and harm currently
and historically borne by low-income minority communities. The terms "environmental
equity" and "environmental racism" are often used to refer to the same movement and will
be used interchangeably throughout this Article. The author finds the term "environmen-
tal equity" the least inflammatory and therefore perhaps the most useful of the terms, but
recognizes the validity and importance of the others in appropriate circumstances. See
Karl Grossman, From Toxic Racism to Environmental Justice, E: THE ENVTL. MAG., May-
June 1992, at 31; see also, Richard Lazarus, The Meaning and Promotion of Environmental
Justice, 5 MD. J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 1 (1994) (defining the origins and objectives of
'environmental justice'); Michel Gelobter, The Meaning of Urban Environmental Justice,
21 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 841, 844 (1994) (distinguishing between "environmental racism"
and "environmental justice").
30. Been, supra note 24, at 1005 n.13 (citing Community Alliance for the Env't v.
Dinkins, No. 400080/93 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., New York County, filed Feb. 25, 1993) (alleging
violation of environmental and zoning laws in an incinerator siting decision)). Environ-
mental justice advocates have also lobbied Congress and other legislative bodies seeking
the enactment of laws regulating distribution of environmental risk. Id. at 1005. For exam-
ple, environmental justice advocates in New York City were instrumental in pushing the
legislature to pass the "fair share" law, which requires that each of the City's five boroughs
bear its fair share of the City's. undesirable sitings. Id. Other states are considering similar
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such suits using civil rights, equal protection, 31 and environmental law
approaches. 32 To date, however, the civil rights and equal protection at-
tempts have been largely unsuccessful.3 3 Only the environmental law-
based approaches have succeeded in delaying, and occasionally prevent-
ing, the construction of new polluting facilities.34
Consequently, many environmental justice lawsuits attempt to use en-
vironmental laws to block the construction of new polluting facilities
which, because they are new, would be subject to the most stringent envi-
ronmental standards to date. At the same time, many polluting facilities
already located in low-income minority communities have been there for
legislation. See id. (citing examples of contemplated state legislation requiring guidelines
in siting decisions).
31. R.I.S.E., Inc. v. Kay, 768 F. Supp. 1144, 1145 (E.D. Va. 1991), aff'd, 977 F.2d 573
(4th Cir. 1992); East Bibb Twiggs Neighborhood Ass'n v. Macon-Bibb County Planning &
Zoning Comm'n, 706 F. Supp. 880, 881 (M.D. Ga.), aff'd, 896 F.2d 1264 (11th Cir. 1989);
Bean v. Southwestern Waste Management Corp., 482 F. Supp. 673, 675 (S.D. Tex. 1979),
aff'd, 782 F.2d 1038 (5th Cir. 1986); see also Bowman v. City of Franklin, 980 F.2d 1104
(7th Cir. 1992) (dismissing an equal protection challenge to a proposed waste management
facility on the grounds that there was no allegation of racial discrimination), cert. denied,
113 S. Ct. 2417 (1993).
32. El Pueblo Para el Aire y Agua Limpio v. County of Kings, 22 Envtl. L. Rep.
(Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,357 (Cal. Super. Ct. Sacramento County, Dec. 30, 1991). In this case,
involving an allegation that the decision to cite an incinerator in a predominantly Hispanic
neighborhood violated the California Environmental Quality Act and other laws, the court
held that an environmental impact report and other environmental review documents for a
proposed hazardous waste incinerator should have been translated into Spanish, the pri-
mary language of the surrounding community. Id. at 20,357-58; Been, supra note 24, at
1005 n.13.
33. See Gerrard, supra note 16, at 1129. These attempts have failed, in part, because
plaintiffs could not prove a discriminatory intent or purpose, which is required to maintain
a successful civil rights or equal protection challenge. Id.; see Village of Arlington Heights
v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 270-71 (1977) (noting that "[r]espondents
simply failed to carry their burden of proving that discriminatory purpose was not a moti-
vating factor").
34. Environmental law-based approaches have been successful at stopping the siting of
hazardous waste and radioactive waste facilities. These approaches have also been moder-
ately successful in stopping disposal facilities for less dangerous materials. See Gerrard,
supra note 16, at 1102-03; see also MICHAEL B. GERRARD, WHOSE BACKYARD, WHOSE
RISK: FEAR AND FAIRNESS IN TOXIC AND NUCLEAR WASTE SITING 54-66 (1994) (describ-
ing permissive language that appears in many environmental statutes and regulations).
However, Luke Cole argues that traditional environmental law does not provide effective
solutions to the environmental law problems presented in circumstances of environmental
racism. Luke W. Cole, Empowerment as the Key to Environmental Protection: The Need
for Environmental Poverty Law, 19 ECOLOGY L.Q. 619, 641-49 (1992); see also Rachel D.
Godsil & James S. Freeman, Jobs, Trees, and Autonomy: The Convergence of the Environ-
mental Justice Movement and Community Economic Development, 5 MD. J. CONTEMP.
LEGAL ISSUES 25, 33-34 (1993-94) (outlining Luke Cole's argument that traditional envi-
ronmental laws do not protect the poor or people of color on an equal basis).
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decades,"5 and because of environmental grandfather clauses, are entitled
to remain there, often subject to less stringent environmental standards.
This Article argues that lawsuits to block the siting or construction of
new facilities, even when successful, are of limited utility, partly because
communities plan very few new polluting facilities. Serious pollution and
environmental harm already exist in the neighborhoods at issue, and liti-
gation to stop new polluting facilities does not improve the existing envi-
ronments. This Article suggests that environmental justice advocates
employ an alternative approach to achieving environmental equity. Spe-
cifically, they should attempt to minimize or eliminate the benefits and
protections that environmental grandfather clauses confer on older pol-
luting facilities. This approach, if successful, would not only promote
more equitable regulation of polluting facilities, but could also improve
the quality of the environment in low-income minority communities.
Because it is a goal of the environmental justice movement to improve
the quality of the environment in low-income, minority communities,36
environmental justice advocates should address the older grandfathered
facilities that currently cause the most environmental damage to their
neighborhoods. Environmental justice advocates should work to reduce
or eliminate the benefits and protections environmental grandfather
clauses confer on older polluting facilities. If successful, this would sub-
ject older facilities to more stringent standards, and perhaps decrease or
stop the further accumulation of pollution from those facilities. In addi-
tion, it would create a more balanced and equitable regulatory scenario
for all communities and industries.
Although this Article is premised on the argument that environmental
grandfather clauses have had a disproportionate and adverse impact on
low-income minority communities, the inequities caused by environmen-
tal grandfather clauses would exist regardless of race. Environmental
grandfather clauses create inequitable regulation of similar facilities
based solely on the age of the facility. This inherent inequity in the regu-
lation of polluting facilities due to environmental grandfather clauses,
would exist regardless of the racial or demographic makeup of surround-
ing communities. So, even if race were not an issue, one should still ques-
35. In 1992, one environmental policy analyst surmised that "[i]t is probably possible
to count on one hand the number of new facilities successfully sited in the United States
over the past 10 years." 1 KENT E. PORTNEY, CONTROVERSIAL ISSUES IN ENVIRONMEN-
TAL POLICY 153 (1992). In fact, only one of the 21 currently operating commercial hazard-
ous waste landfills is located on a site selected since RCRA was enacted in 1976. Gerrard,
supra note 16, at 1098-99.
36. Robert D. Bullard, The Threat of Environmental Racism, NAT. RESOURCES &
ENV'T, Winter 1993, at 23, 56; see also Grossman, supra note 29, at 30, 35.
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tion the use of grandfather clauses to give preference or protection to
older facilities.
This Article examines the language and operation of specific provisions
that amount to grandfather clauses in the Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act (RCRA),37 the Clean Air Act,38 land use and zoning law,
and certain state provisions.39 It will illustrate how each of these systems
of environmental regulation allows older polluting facilities to remain in
operation, subject to less stringent regulation than is applicable to new
facilities, n° thereby inflicting greater amounts of pollution on the neigh-
borhoods in which they are located.41 This Article will discuss the rea-
sons lawmakers use grandfather clauses both in general and in
37. The various pieces of legislation commonly referred to as the "Resource Conserva-
tion and Recovery Act" are codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-92(k) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
38. The various pieces of legislation commonly referred to as the "Clean Air Act" are
codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
39. This Article will address one example of grandfathering under New York's Envi-
ronmental Conservation Law. See infra notes 111-22 and accompanying text (discussing
BDT). Many other state provisions, not addressed in this Article also contain environmen-
tal grandfather clauses. See, e.g., New York's State Environmental Quality Review Act
(SEQRA), which exempts from compliance any action undertaken or approved prior to
the statute's effective date, N.Y. ENVTL CONSERV. LAW § 8-011.5(a) (McKinney 1984), and
Maine's Hazardous Waste Sewage and Solid Waste Management Act, ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 38, § 1308 (West 1989), which allows facilities in existence on October 3, 1973 to
continue to operate without complying with the statute's provisions regarding location,
establishment and construction of solid waste disposal facilities. This law does not, how-
ever, exempt such facilities from complying with regulations regarding alteration or opera-
tion. Dept. of Envtl. Protection v. Emerson, 563 A.2d 762, 768-69 (Maine 1989); see also
FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 62-701.330(1) (1990) (Florida's landfill requirements); N.Y.
COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 6, § 201.6(r), (y) (1966) (New York state's air pollution
regulations).
40. While other federal laws also include provisions that function as environmental
grandfather clauses, this Article does not attempt to address each one. Instead, this Article
attempts only to illustrate the operation and effects of such clauses by discussing three
representative examples. Other examples include: The Clean Air Act's solid waste com-
bustion rule, 42 U.S.C. § 7429(b); the Clean Water Act's rules for publicly-owned treat-
ment works, 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(1)(B) (1988); the National Environmental Policy Act's
environmental impact statement requirements, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370(a); restrictions on
trade in endangered species, 16 U.S.C. § 1539(b)(1) (1988); the designation of areas suita-
ble for mining under the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act, 30 U.S.C.
§ 1272(a)(6) (1988); the EPA's regulations on municipal solid waste landfills, 40 C.F.R.
§ 258.16(a) (1994); the Clean Water Act provisions which provide authorization for the
Army Corps of Engineers' policy of grandfathering prior wetlands determinations, 33
U.S.C. § 404; 5 U.S.C. § 702; and the regulations set forth under the Hazardous Materials
Transportation Act, 49 C.F.R. § 173.23 (1994). A comprehensive review of these provi-
sions is beyond the scope of this Article.
41. The EPA has determined that older municipal solid waste facilities pose the great-
est health and environmental threat as compared to similar new facilities. Solid Waste
Disposal Facility Criteria, 53 Fed. Reg. 33,314, 33,319 (1988). Note that in addition to
causing harm where they are located, many facilities emitting water or air pollutants also
cause environmental damage in downstream or downwind localities. Id. at 33,314.
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environmental laws. It will discuss the role of fairness in arguments for
the creation of grandfather clauses, and in arguments for reducing or
eliminating the benefits and protections they confer on older sources of
pollution. Finally, it will propose some suggestions for eliminating
grandfather clauses, or reducing or amortizing grandfathered benefits.
This Article will demonstrate that eliminating or reducing grandfathered
protectionism can lead to the cleaning up or shutting down of polluting
facilities, and potential environmental improvement for communities.
II. THREE EXAMPLES OF ENVIRONMENTAL GRANDFATHER CLAUSES
A. Grandfather Clauses in Hazardous Waste Law: The Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA)
RCRA, the major federal law governing the generation, treatment,
storage, transportation and disposal of hazardous waste, was intended to
be a "cradle to grave" regulatory system to track hazardous waste from
creation to disposal.42 However, RCRA includes two significantly differ-
ent regulatory systems within its regulation of hazardous waste treatment,
storage, or disposal facilities (TSDFs). Congress did not require certain
existing TSDFs to meet the tougher new siting and technology standards
it created.43 Instead, Congress created a separate system within RCRA,
known as "interim status", through which older facilities were allowed to
operate without complying with the tough standards and operating per-
mit requirements applicable to similar new facilities." Referring to the
marked disparity in regulatory stringency, one commentator has called
42. For a comprehensive, practical look at RCRA regulatory requirements, see SUE
M. BRIGGUM ET AL., HAZARDOUS WASTE REGULATION HANDBOOK: A PRACTICAL
GUIDE TO RCRA AND SUPERFUND (1985) (providing, in outline form, a straightforward,
practical look at RCRA requirements).
43. See RCRA § 3005(e), 42 U.S.C. § 6925(e) (1984).
44. Id.; see General Motors Corp. v. Dept. of Natural Resources, 472 N.W.2d 49, 50-51
(Mich. Ct. App. 1991) (per curiam) (stating that "[i]nterim status is merely a statutorily
conferred grandfather provision which allows a facility to continue operations until a per-
mit is issued").
Municipal solid waste facilities are regulated under RCRA, Subtitle D, and hazardous
waste TSDF facilities are regulated under RCRA Subtitle C. There are some significant
distinctions between the regulatory processes applicable to these two different types of
facilities, indicating that although both are eligible for interim status, the applicable rules
are different. Under RCRA, older facilities regulated by Subtitle C, the hazardous waste
facilities, are more stringently controlled than those subject to Subtitle D, the municipal
solid waste facilities. See Kristen Engel, Environmental Standards as Regulatory Common
Law: Toward Consistency in Solid Waste Regulation, 21 N.M. L. REv. 13, 23 (1990).
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this distinction in RCRA "the old and soft regime as distinguished from
the new and the hard.",45
In RCRA, Congress required EPA to promulgate regulations requiring
new and existing hazardous waste TSDFs to obtain a RCRA operating
permit.46 However, the law also allows a hazardous waste facility, which
otherwise would be subject to the RCRA permit requirement, to operate
as if it has a permit if the facility existed on November 19, 1980, or was in
existence on the effective date of the statutory or regulatory changes ren-
dering the facility subject to RCRA permit requirements.47 The facility is
allowed to operate as if it has a RCRA permit "until such time as final
administrative disposition of [its] application is made."48 In other words,
a qualifying permitless facility is allowed to operate under interim status
until EPA makes a final decision on its pending RCRA permit applica-
tion.49 Interixn status is supposed to be a" 'temporary condition intended
by Congress to enable existing facilities to continue while their perma-
nent permit application is pending. It is a stage prior to the issuance or
denial of a permit.' "
More specifically, existing TSDFs which file a short, initial (Part A)
application and meet certain minimal requirements are granted "interim
45. WILLIAM H. RODGERS, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: HAZARDOUS WASTES AND SUB-
STANCES § 7.14, at 140.
46. RCRA § 3005(a), 42 U.S.C. § 6925(a) (1984). These regulations now appear at 40
C.F.R. §§ 270.1-.73 (1995).
47. RCRA § 3005(e)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 6925(e)(1) (1982 & Supp. 111984). This is a clas-
sic example of an environmental "grandfather clause":
(e) Interim status-(1) Any person who- (A) owns or operates a facility re-
quired to have a permit under this section which facility - (i) was in existence on
November 19, 1980, or (ii) is in existence on the effective date of statutory or
regulatory changes under this chapter that render the facility subject to the re-
quirement to have a permit under this section, (B) has complied with the require-
ments of [Subsection 3010(a)], and (C) has made an application for a permit
under this section shall be treated as having been issued such permit until such
time as final administrative disposition of such application is made, unless the
Administrator or other plaintiff proves that final administrative disposition of
such application has not been made because of the failure of the applicant to
furnish information reasonably required or requested in order to process the ap-
plication. This paragraph shall not apply to any facility which as been previously
denied a permit under this section or if authority to operate the facility under this
section has been previously terminated.
Id.
48. Id.
49. RODGERS, supra note 45, § 7.14, at 135-37.
50. Id. at 136 (citing Hempstead County & Nevada County Project v. Environmental
Protection Agency, 700 F.2d 459, 461-62 (8th Cir. 1983) (holding that interim status is not
something "issued" by the Administrator, but rather a "statutorily conferred grandfather-
ing provision which allows a facility to continue until a permit is issued")); see Vineland
Chemical Co. v. Environmental Protection Agency, 810 F.2d 402, 404 (3d Cir. 1987).
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status," allowing them to continue to operate at lower environmental
standards than new TSDFs.51 To continue operating under interim status
for longer than twelve months, existing TSDFs also must file a longer,
more comprehensive (Part B) application, asking EPA to make a final
determination on its permit application.52 But for the interim status pro-
visions, most of these existing facilities would be operating in clear viola-
tion of the new, more stringent, requirements for the siting and operation
of hazardous waste facilities. This is because lower standards apply to
TSDFs with interim status than to those operating under regular RCRA
permits.53
One fundamental problem with this system is that the applicant facility
may continue to operate under the less stringent interim status standards
until EPA either issues or denies the applicant's request for a final per-
mit.54 This has caused a de facto lowering of standards, because " 'most
facilities are currently operating under interim status.' ,55 Because most
facilities are operating under interim status, and low-income, minority
communities host a greater proportion of hazardous or solid waste land-
fills, these communities are located near many facilities operating under a
less-stringent system of regulation than is applicable to newer facilities.56
This section sets forth and explains the interim status and RCRA-per-
mit regulations applicable to hazardous waste incinerators to demon-
strate how RCRA's interim status provisions amount to an
environmental grandfather clause. It will then discuss the reasons Con-
gress may have created the interim status system. Finally, it will use the
example of a hazardous waste facility in New York state to show that
environmental grandfather clauses exist in hazardous waste law at both
the state and federal level.
51. RCRA § 3005(e), 42 U.S.C. § 6925(e).
52. RCRA § 3005(e), 42 U.S.C. § 6925(e)(2).
53. 40 C.F.R. Part 265 (1995) (standards for interim status facilities); 40 C.F.R. Part
264 (1995) (standards for RCRA permitted facilities).
54. 42 U.S.C. § 6925(i)-() (1988).
55. Alissa J. Stern, A Proposal to Improve Corporate Compliance with RCRA, 22
ENVTL. L. 539, 551 (1992) (quoting GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, HAZARDOUS WASTE:
NEW APPROACH NEEDED TO MANAGE THE RESOURCE CONSERVATION AND RECOVERY
ACT 2 (1988)).
56. Id. at 551 (expressing that one way to reduce or eliminate the inequities in the
regulation of polluting facilities created by the interim status provisions is to push the EPA
to act on permit applications). Although this would certainly eliminate the negative impact
of RCRA's grandfather clause, it does not address the more basic problem of grandfather-
ing in the environmental laws. See id.
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1. Interim Status Standards v. Final RCRA Permit Standards: The
Example of Hazardous Waste Incinerators
As an example of the two-tiered system of environmental control
within RCRA, this section examines the interim status regulations for
hazardous waste incinerators, and compares them to the final RCRA per-
mitting standards for the same type of facility.57 Facilities not qualifying
for interim status must obtain a permit to operate under RCRA and com-
ply with the operating requirements applicable to RCRA-permitted facil-
ities.58 To qualify for interim status, a hazardous waste incinerator must
qualify as an "existing hazardous waste management facility." 9 It must
also make a required notification to EPA regarding its treatment, storage,
or disposal of hazardous waste 60 and file an initial (Part A) application
for a RCRA operating permit.61 While operating under interim status, a
hazardous waste facility may not treat, store, or dispose of any hazardous
waste not listed in its initial application, 6 employ processes other than
those specified, 63 or exceed the design capacity specified in its applica-
tion.6' It may, however, submit a revised application to change the scope
of its permit to include these actions if necessary.6 5
a. RCRA Permitted Hazardous Waste Incinerators
Owners of hazardous waste facilities that do not qualify for interim
status and are not otherwise exempt from the RCRA operating permit
requirements 66 must perform extensive waste analyses on their facili-
57. 40 C.F.R. Part 265, Subpart N (1995) (regulations governing interim status for haz-
ardous waste landfills). 40 C.F.R. Part 264, Subpart N (1995) (regulations governing final
permitting standards for hazardous waste landfills).
58. RCRA § 3005, 42 U.S.C. § 6925 (1982 & Supp. 11 1984).
59. 40 C.F.R. § 270.70 (1995) (stating that any person who owns or operates an "ex-
isting HWM facility ... shall have interim status and shall be treated as having been issued
a permit" after meeting certain requirements). An "existing hazardous waste management
facility" is one which was "in operation or for which construction commenced on or before
November 18, 1980." 40 C.F.R. § 270.2 (1995).
60. RCRA § 3010(a), 42 U.S.C. 6930(a); 40 C.F.R. § 270.70(a)(1) (1994).
61. 40 C.F.R. § 270.70(a)(2) (1995). Note that facilities may fail to qualify for interim
status despite meeting these qualifications. Facilities that have been denied a RCRA per-
mit or have failed to provide certain information with regard to their application for a
RCRA permit may be ineligible for interim status. 40 C.F.R. § 270.70(b)-(c) (1995).
62. 40 C.F.R. § 270.71(a-1)(a)(1) (1995).
63. 40 C.F.R. § 270.71(a-2)(a)(2) (1995).
64. 40 C.F.R. § 270.71(a-3)(a)(3) (1995).
65. 40 C.F.R. § 270.72 (1995).
66. Some hazardous waste incinerators are exempt and therefore not regulated under
the Part 264 and 265, Subpart 0 standards because they do not burn sufficiently hazardous
wastes. 40 C.F.R. §§ 264.340(b), 265.340(b) (1995). For purposes of this Article, "hazard-
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ties.67 They must test the output of their facilities by performing periodic
trial burns according to a detailed plan to verify that the waste going into
the incinerator "waste feed" is within the physical and chemical composi-
tion parameters specified in the facility's permit.68 In addition, prior to
obtaining their operating permits, these facilities had to have done an
extensive waste analysis to qualify for the permit.69 To qualify for a haz-
ardous waste incinerator permit, owners of hazardous waste incinerators
must also satisfy the EPA that their facilities are capable of complying
with specific performance standards and operating conditions set forth in
the regulations.70
To assist EPA in determining what standards should apply to a particu-
lar facility, owners of hazardous waste incinerators must submit suggested
permit conditions.7' They must also prepare and propose a trial burn
plan including: an analysis of each waste or mixture of wastes to be
burned,71 a detailed engineering description of the incinerator, 73 a de-
ous waste incinerator" will refer to those facilities regulated by the Subpart 0 standards for
either interim status or final RCRA permits.
67. 40 C.F.R. § 264.341 (1995).
68. Id.
69. Id. (stating that Part B permit holders must have produced an analysis of the
waste feed sufficient to provide all information required by 40 C.F.R. §§ 270.62(b) or
270.19); 40 C.F.R. § 270.62 (1995) (setting forth extensive conditions applicable to permits
for hazardous waste incinerators).
70. 40 C.F.R. § 270.62(a)(2), (b) (1995). The applicable performance standards and
operating conditions are at 40 C.F.R. §§ 264.343, 264.345 (1995).
71. 40 C.F.R. § 270.62(a)(1) (1995) (stating that minimum suggested permit conditions
must include suggested restrictions on waste constituents, waste feed rate and operating
parameters).
72. 40 C.F.R. § 270.62(b)(i) (1995). This analysis must include the "[h]eat value of the
waste in the form and composition in which it will be burned," the "[v]iscosity ... or
description of the physical form of the waste ... faln identification of any hazardous or-
ganic constituents present in the waste," and "[a]n approximate quantification of the haz-
ardous constituents identified in the waste." Id.
73. 40 C.F.R. § 270.62(b)(2)(ii) (1995). The detailed engineering description must
include:
(A) Manufacturer's name and model number of the incinerator (if available).
(B) Type of incinerator.
(C) Linear dimensions of the incinerator unit, including the cross sectional area
of the combustion chamber.
(D) Description of the auxiliary fuel system type/feed.
(E) Capacity of the prime mover.
(F) Description of the automatic waste cut off system(s).
(G) Stack gas monitoring and pollution control equipment.
(H) Nozzle and burner design.
(I) Construction materials.
(J) Location and description of temperature, pressure, and flow indicating and
control devices.
Catholic University Law Review
scription of the procedures the plant will use to sample and monitor its
waste,74 a test schedule for each waste for which the trial burn is
planned, 75 a test protocol, 76 a description of, and proposed operating con-
ditions for emission control equipment which will be used to control the
plant's output,77 "[p]rocedures for rapidly stopping waste feed, shutting
down the incinerator, and controlling emissions in the event of a malfunc-
tion,' 78 and other information necessary to determine whether the trial
burn plan is satisfactory. 79 Based on the information EPA receives from
the waste analysis data, EPA will create trial Principle Organic Hazard-
ous Constituents (POHCs).
POHCs are those ingredients in the trial burn for which the plant must
calculate destruction and removal efficiencies-basically, a determination
of how well the incinerator is actually breaking down the waste. 80 The
facility's operating permit specifies the principal POHCs,81 and the plant
must treat them in accordance with performance standards applicable to
regular RCRA-permitted hazardous waste incinerators (those not operat-
ing under interim status).82 In addition, throughout the normal operation
of the incinerator, owners must continue testing the waste to verify that it
is within the physical and chemical composition limits specified in the
facility's permit.83
A RCRA-permitted incinerator must meet the operating requirements
set forth in its operating permit.' During start-up and shut-down of the
facility, operators may not feed hazardous waste into the incinerator un-
74. 40 C.F.R. § 270.62(b)(2)(iii) (1995).
75. 40 C.F.R. § 270.62(b)(2)(iv) (1995) (including the date(s), duration, and quantity
of waste to be burned).
76. 40 C.F.R. § 270.62(b)(2)(v) (1995) (stating that the test protocol must include "the
ranges of temperature, waste feed rate, combustion gas velocity, use of auxiliary fuel, and
any other relevant parameter that will be varied to affect the destruction and removal
efficiency of the incinerator").
77. 40 C.F.R. § 270.62(b)(2)(vi) (1995).
78. 40 C.F.R. § 270.62(b)(2)(vii) (1995).
79. 40 C.F.R. § 270.62(b)(2)(viii) (1995).
80. 40 C.F.R. § 270.62(b)(4) (1995).
81. 40 C.F.R. § 264.342(b)(1) (1995).
82. 40 C.F.R. § 264.243(a) (1995). The performance standards applicable to hazard-
ous waste incinerators are complicated, and in most cases require that the incinerator
"achieve a destruction and removal efficiency (DRE) of 99.99% for each [POHCI desig-
nated ... in its permit for each waste feed." 40 C.F.R. § 264.343(a)(1) (1995).
83. 40 C.F.R. § 264.341(b) (1995).
84. 40 C.F.R. § 264.345(a), (b) (1995) (stating that operating requirements are deter-
mined on a "case-by-case basis" based on the results of trial burns and other data). "Each
set of operating requirements will specify the composition of the waste feed (including the
physical or chemical properties composition of the waste feed)." Id. Permits will also
include operating conditions that include operating limits on "[c]arbon monoxide (co) level
in the stack exhaust; [wiaste feed rate; [clombustion temperature; [a]n appropriate indica-
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less it is functioning within its operating conditions.8 5 Facilities must con-
trol the fugitive emissions-those emissions from the incinerator that
escape uncontrolled into the environment,8 6 and operate with a func-
tional system to cut-off the feeding of waste to the incinerator automati-
cally when operating conditions deviate from prescribed limits. 87 "An
incinerator must cease operation when changes in waste feed, incinerator
design or operating conditions exceed" or otherwise violate permitted
conditions or limits. 88
RCRA permitted incinerators are also subject to some additional in-
spection and reporting requirements. 89 For example, owners must sub-
ject incinerators and associated equipment "to thorough visual
inspection, at least daily, for leaks, spills, fugitive emissions, and signs of
tampering."9 Also, "[tlhe emergency waste feed cutoff system and asso-
ciated alarms must be tested at least weekly to verify operability,"91 and
all of this monitoring and inspection data must be recorded with the
records placed in the incinerator's operating log.92
b. Interim Status Hazardous Waste Incinerators
Like similar facilities functioning under RCRA operating permits, haz-
ardous waste incinerators operating under interim status must also per-
form certain waste analysis functions.93 They must perform the general
waste analysis applicable to all interim status facilities. 4 This analysis
includes obtaining a chemical and physical evaluation of a representative
sample of the wastes which, at a minimum, must contain all the informa-
tor of combustion gas velocity; [a]llowable variations in incinerator system design or oper-
ating procedures." Id.
85. 40 C.F.R. § 264.345(c) (1995).
86. 40 C.F.R. § 264.345(d) (1995) (stating that facilities must control fugitive emissions
from the combustion zone by maintaining a totally sealed combustion zone, keeping the
combustion zone pressure lower than atmospheric pressure, or by providing equivalent
control).
87. 40 C.F.R. § 264.345(e) (1995).
88. 40 C.F.R. § 264.345(f) (1995).
89. 40 C.F.R. § 264.347(a) (1995). Owners must monitor, at a minimum, combustion
temperature, waste feed rate, and the indicator of combustion gas velocity as specified in
the permit. Id. Owners must monitor "CO on a continuous basis at a point in the incinera-
tor downstream of the combustion zone and prior to the release into the atmosphere." Id.
Owners must, upon the request of EPA, conduct sampling and analysis of the waste and
exhaust emissions to verify compliance with performance standards. Id.
90. 40 C.F.R. § 264.347(b) (1995).
91. 40 C.F.R. § 264.347(c) (1995).
92. 40 C.F.R. § 264.347(d) (1995).
93. 40 C.F.R. § 265.341 (1995).
94. 40 C.F.R. § 265.13 (1995).
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tion needed to treat, store, or dispose of the waste.95 The owner must
repeat this analysis, as necessary, to keep it current. 96 Owners must in-
spect and, if necessary, analyze hazardous waste received at the incinera-
tor to determine whether it matches the manifest with which it arrived.97
The owner must also follow a written waste analysis plan, which describes
the procedures for carrying out the analysis.98
In addition to meeting these general requirements for waste analysis,
owners of interim status incinerators must analyze any waste which has
not previously been burned in a particular incinerator to establish normal
operating conditions (also called "steady state" conditions) and to deter-
mine the type of pollutants which might be emitted upon burning of this
new waste.99 This requirement is significantly less stringent than those
required of comparable facilities operating under regular RCRA operat-
ing permits.
The general operating requirements applicable to interim status incin-
erators are also less stringent, and less complicated than those applicable
to RCRA permitted incinerators. In short, during start-up or shut-down,
the owner "must not feed hazardous waste unless the incinerator is at
steady state (normal) conditions of operation."' °
Finally, the monitoring and inspection requirements of interim status
incinerators are less stringent than those required of permitted facilities.
Every fifteen minutes, owners of interim status incinerators must monitor
and inspect those portions of the incinerator which relate to combustion
and emission control.' 0 ' Similar inspections must occur daily for the
95. 40 C.F.R. § 265.13(a)(1) (1995).
96. 40 C.F.R. § 265.13(a)(3) (1995) (stating that, at a minimum, the owner must repeat
the analysis whenever he or she is notified, or has reason to believe, that the process or
operation generating the waste has changed, and when the results of an inspection show
that the waste received at the facility does not match that described on the manifest).
97. 40 C.F.R. § 265.13(a)(4) (1995).
98. 40 C.F.R. § 265.13(b) (1995) (stating that this plan must specify the parameters for
which each waste will be analyzed "and the rationale for the selection of these parame-
ters," the test methods which will be used to test the waste, "the sampling method which
will be used to obtain a representative sample of the waste," and "the frequency with
which the initial analysis of the waste will be reviewed or repeated"). There are additional
requirements for off-site facilities and surface impoundments. 40 C.F.R. § 265.13(b)(5),(7)
(1995).
99. 40 C.F.R. § 265.341 (1995). Steady state (normal) operating conditions include
waste and auxiliary fuel feed and air flow. Id. At minimum, this analysis must determine
the heating value of the waste, the halogen and sulfur content in the waste and concentra-
tions of lead and mercury. Id.
100. 40 C.F.R. § 265.345 (1995) (noting that steady state includes steady state operating
temperature and air flow).
101. 40 C.F.R. § 265.347(a) (1995). Owners must make appropriate correction to main-
tain steady state combustion. Id. Instruments which relate to combustion and emissions,
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complete incinerator and associated equipment,10 2 as well as for leaks,
spills, and fugitive emissions. Emergency shutdown controls and system
alarms must also be inspected daily to assure proper operation. 10 3
Fundamentally, interim status standards are weaker and more accom-
modating than the standards applicable to RCRA-permitted facilities
with housekeeping requirements but no performance standards, softer
technologies, more excuses, and reduced monitoring and inspection obli-
gations.10 4 As described above, a hazardous waste incinerator in continu-
ous operation since before RCRA was enacted could qualify for interim
status. RCRA subjects that older facility to the less stringent interim sta-
tus performance and operating standards, rather than to the more strin-
gent standards required of newer RCRA-permitted incinerators.105
2. RCRA Permits and Interim Status - The Why and Wherefore
Congress may have created this two-tiered regulatory system because it
feared that most of the existing facilities would have been forced to shut
down if required to meet tougher new standards too quickly, thereby cre-
ating a capacity shortage for generated hazardous waste. 0 6 Congress
may have been concerned with issues of fairness as it created new regula-
tions applicable to solid and hazardous waste facilities. Finally, the in-
terim status provisions may have been Congress' practical response to an
admitted administrative incapacity to carry out the permitting task.10 7
Even when EPA began to implement RCRA, the agency was unac-
ceptably slow to issue regulations. Under a court order, EPA eventually
issued regulations governing the granting of permits to hazardous waste
facilities. Thereafter, EPA was slow to issue permits under the new rules.
By 1985, only five landfills and seventeen incinerators had received
RCRA permits." 8 This left the remaining facilities to operate under in-
terim status. Some say that interim status took on a "life of its own" as it
and which therefore are subject to this inspection would normally include those measuring
waste feed, auxiliary fuel feed, air flow, incinerator temperature, scrubber flow, scrubber
pH, etc. Id.
102. 40 C.F.R. § 265.347(b) (1995) (stating that associated equipment includes pumps,
valves, conveyors, pipes, etc.).
103. Id.
104. RODGERS, supra note 45, § 7.14, at 142.
105. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, HAZARDOUS WASTE: INCINERATOR OPER-
ATING REGULATIONS AND RELATED AIR EMISSION STANDARDS 2 (Oct. 1991) (GAO/
RCED-92-21).
106. Gerrard, supra note 16, at 1100.
107. RODGERS, supra note 45, § 7.14, at 136, 136 n.3 (noting that enforcement of the
general prohibition of Section 3005 would have been " 'completely disrupting' to 'ongoing
operations' ").
108. PORTNEY, supra note 35, at 145.
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became reality for approximately 8000 facilities.1"9 Referring to the regu-
latory exemptions provided by interim status, critics contended that" 'the
hole [was] bigger than the doughnut.' "110
3. BDT, Inc.: A Brief Case Study of An Environmental Grandfather
Clause
The above analysis demonstrates how RCRA's interim status provi-
sions operate as an environmental grandfather clause, allowing older haz-
ardous waste facilities to operate under less stringent regulation than is
applicable to newer facilities. Similar circumstances exist in hazardous
waste law at the state level. This section presents a practical example of
an environmental grandfather clause in New York hazardous waste law.
In the town of Clarence, located in western New York, an environmen-
tal grandfather clause has allowed a hazardous waste facility to remain
exempt from state siting certification rules because it predated current
law.1 ' Although hazardous waste treatment, disposal or storage facilities
ordinarily fall under the regulatory control of the New York State Siting
Board (Board)," 2 the BDT Inc.113 facility was established in 1980, two
109. RODGERS, supra note 45, § 7.14, at 136; see PORTNEY, supra note 35, at 145.
110. RODGERS, supra note 45, § 7.14, at 136-37 (quoting Richard C. Fortuna, Prevent-
ing Hazardous Waste Management Liability: The Lessons of Recent Legislation 25 Hous. L.
REV. 877, 878 (1988)); see also David Schnapf, State and Hazardous Waste Programs Under
the Federal Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 12 ENVTL. L. 679, 729 (1982) (noting
that the concept of interim status of unlimited duration is unique among the major federal
environmental permitting programs). Most environmental permit programs prohibit facili-
ties from operating or engaging in certain activities until a facility has obtained the re-
quired permit. Id. Under RCRA, however, a facility may operate under "interim status"
until it has obtained a permit. Id. Although the availability of "interim status" makes the
RCRA program appear less stringent than other regulatory programs, it may not actually
be less stringent in its application. Id. In other environmental permitting programs, EPA
rarely seeks to stop an existing facility from operating without a permit if the facility has
applied for one. Id. The requirement that unpermitted facilities cease operations takes
those facilities out of the regulatory system while RCRA's interim status scheme keeps
facilities within the agency's regulatory control. Id.
111. New York's Environmental Conservation Law requires the commissioner of the
Department of Environmental Conservation to publish criteria for the siting of certain
industrial hazardous waste facilities. N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 27-1103.1 (McKinney
1984 & Supp. 1995). After the publication of those criteria, new facilities could not com-
mence construction or operation without a certificate of environmental safety and public
necessity from the facility siting board. § 27-1105.1. The siting certification requirement
applies to new facilities, but, except for a 1987 amendment which expanded the law to
include expansions of existing commercial landfills, not to existing facilities. See infra notes
207-20 and accompanying text (discussing CECOS v. Jorling, 895 F.2d 66 (2d Cir. 1990)).
112. N.Y. ENvTL. CONSERV. LAW § 27-1105 (McKinney 1984 & Supp. 1995) (regarding
the authority of the state siting certification board).
113. BDT, Inc., which stands for "battery disposal technology" is a subsidiary of Wilson
Greathbatch Ltd., a locally owned manufacturer of medical and commercial batteries.
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years before the Board was established.114 Because BDT was in opera-
tion before the Board was established, it was not subject to Board
review.' 15
BDT and Clarence currently disagree about BDT's right to transfer its
stock to Laidlaw Environmental Services,1 16 one of the largest hazardous
waste companies in North America." 7 BDT also seeks state approval to
transfer its operating permits to Laidlaw.118 In an attempt to stop the
relevant transfers, the town proposed a local ordinance which attempts to
give the town a voice in future expansions at the Clarence BDT facil-
ity.119 The proposed law would authorize the town to regulate expan-
sions of existing industrial hazardous waste treatment, storage and
disposal facilities. 2 ° Opponents of the proposed law argue that the state
maintains preemptive authority over such facilities. 12 1 Supporters argue
that it would give the town co-extensive permitting authority and some
control over the growth of polluting industry in its community, and possi-
bly primary permitting authority under the State Environmental Quality
Review Act (SEQRA). 22 They argue that the town's authority should
not be preempted by the state because the state siting law retains author-
ity only over facilities subject to that law, and not to predating facilities,
like BDT. Because the BDT facility was never subject to state siting cer-
tification review, the state should not have preemptive authority over the
permitting of its expansions.
The BDT case is a clear example of a facility benefitting by virtue of an
environmental grandfather clause. If the BDT facility had been subject
to the state hazardous waste siting board review, the Board could have
Dick Dawson, Waste-Treatment Firm May Halt Tax Payments, BUFF. NEWS, Oct. 17, 1993,
at B5; Dick Dawson, County Joins Fight Against BDT, BUFF. NEWS, June 3, 1993, at D9.
114. Dick Dawson, Clarence Board Wants to Meet With BDT Aides, BuFF. NEWS, Mar.
5, 1994, at C5.
115. Id; Dick Dawson, BDT Drops Lawsuit as Clarence Cooperates, Company Eager to
Explain its Objections to Proposed Town Ordinance, BuFF. NEWS, Mar. 11, 1994; see also
Town of North Hempstead v. New York State Dept. of Envtl. Conservation, 445 N.Y.S.2d
877 (1981) (finding the statutory requirement that the siting board must issue a certificate
of environmental safety and public interest before any person may operate a new industrial
waste facility applicable only to new constructions or new operations, not to continuing
operations).
116. Dick Dawson, Laidlaw Foes Buoyed by Recent Rulings, BUFF. NEWS, Dec. 8, 1993.
117. Dawson, Waste Treatment Firm, supra note 113.
118. Dawson, BDT Drops Lawsuit, supra note 115.
119. Clarence Will Turn Over Records Sought by BDT, Buir. NEWS, Mar. 1, 1994.
120. Diane Heminway, Western NY Toxics Report, Toxics IN YOUR COMMUNITY
NEWSLETrER, Winter 1994, at 15.
121. Telephone Interview with R. Nils Olsen, Professor of Law, SUNY Buffalo School
of Law.
122. Id.; Clarence Will Turn Over Records, supra note 119.
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regulated the facility's expansion rights and would have undertaken envi-
ronmental review at appropriate stages of the process. The town's re-
sponse to the BDT situation exemplifies a community coming to terms
with the impact of an environmental grandfather clause, and attempting
to find a way to circumvent the protection it provides for an older pollut-
ing facility.
B. Grandfather Clauses in The Clean Air Act
Like RCRA, the Clean Air Act includes grandfather clauses that allow
older, existing facilities to operate according to less stringent regulations
than their new facility counterparts. In doing so, the Clean Air Act
makes a clear, formal distinction between "old" and "new" sources of air
pollution risk'23 by creating an entirely separate set of stringent perform-
ance standards for "new sources" of air pollutants.'24 Although all
sources of air pollution are subject to ambient air quality regulation
through source-specific emission limitations, new sources face more strin-
gent pollution control technologies and permitting requirements than are
required for existing facilities.' 25
Like the two-tiered regulatory system in RCRA, the similar system in
the Clean Air Act allows older polluting facilities to pollute in greater
amounts than would be permitted for similar new facilities. 126  Because
of this disparity in regulatory standards, working in conjunction with the
established disparity in the siting of polluting facilities, low-income, mi-
nority communities suffer a disproportionately high burden of air pollu-
tion risk. 127 This section will discuss some of the provisions within the
Clean Air Act that function as grandfather clauses. 128 It will show how
123. Peter Huber, The Old-New Division in Risk Regulation, 69 VA. L. REV. 1025, 1040
(1983).
124. Id. at 1041.
125. F. William Brownell, The Clean Air Act, in THE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW HAND-
BOOK 101, § 2.2., at 109 (Thomas F.P. Sullivan ed., 1995). Some argue that even seemingly
consistent technology-based pollution control standards, such as the best available technol-
ogy (BAT) standard in the Clean Air Act are inconsistent in their practical application.
Bruce Akerman & Richard Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law: the Democratic Case
for Market Incentives, 13 COLUM. J. ENVTL. LAW 171, 173-75 (1988).
126. Id.
127. Michel Gelobter, The Distribution of Outdoor Air Pollution by Income and Race:
1970-1986 (1986) (unpublished Masters Thesis, Energy and Resources Group, University
of California, Berkeley); see also Michel Gelobter, Toward a Model of "Environmental
Discrimination," in RACE AND THE INCIDENCE OF ENVIRONMENTAL HAZARDS, (Bunyan
Bryant & Paul Mohai eds., 1992) (discussing studies which have determined that minorities
and the poor are most commonly exposed to pollution).
128. This Article does not attempt to address every regulatory framework within the
Clean Air Act that acts as an environmental "grandfather clause."
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they operate to create a two-tiered regulatory system, similar to that dis-
cussed with respect to RCRA, that puts low-income, minority communi-
ties at a regulatory and risk-bearing disadvantage.
1. New Source Performance Standards
Clean Air Act section 111 required the EPA Administrator to identify
categories of new and modified sources that contribute significantly to air
pollution which endangers public health or welfare."2 9 Most major indus-
trial processes have been so identified, and many are located in low-in-
come minority communities. However, older facilities within the same
groups of industrial processes do not fall within the regulatory scope of
section 111.
EPA must set emission standards that reflect the "degree of emission
limitation achievable" through the technology that the agency determines
has been "adequately demonstrated" to be the best, taking into consider-
ation "non-air quality health and environmental impacts and energy re-
quirements.' 131 These standards apply only to new or modified sources
identified as significant contributors to air pollution which endangers
public health and welfare. 31 The standards, called New Source Perform-
ance Standards (NSPS), may be promulgated as design, equipment, work
practice, or operational standards where numerical emission limitations
are not feasible. 132 Each NSPS includes the types of facilities to which
the standard applies.'3 3 Once determined, the NSPS is the minimum
level of control that EPA or the state can require of a new or modified
source through a related program, the new source pre-construction per-
mitting program.' 34
Originally, new source performance standards specified how many
pounds of a specific pollutant a plant could emit per unit of plant input or
output. Under this system each pollutant source determined what combi-
nation of technological measures and fuel changes to use to achieve the
standard. But under the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977,'35 Con-
gress directed EPA to approach NSPS differently. EPA now sets a per-
centage of emission reduction based on source emissions without air
129. Clean Air Act § 111, 42 U.S.C. § 7411 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
130. Clean Air Act § 111(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(1) (Supp. V 1993).
131. Id.
132. 40 C.F.R. Part 60 (1995) (setting forth the NSPS standards).
133. Id.
134. States often implement this system through EPA-approved implementation plans
under the Clean Air Act. See, e.g., Idaho Dept. of Health and Welfare v. United States
Dept. of Energy, 959 F.2d 149, 150 (9th Cir. 1992) (discussing Idaho's right to require
permits at "grandfathered sites if there is additional construction or a modification").
135. Clean Air Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, 91 Stat. 685 (1977).
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pollution control technology.'36 This is a significantly more effective ap-
proach to controlling emissions, yet it does not apply to existing sources.
2. New Source Review
Major new sources of air pollution, and in most cases, major modifica-
tions of existing sources (which, in many circumstances, are treated like
new major sources), are also subject to preconstruction review and per-
mitting under the Clean Air Act. The types of requirements applicable
depend on whether the new major source, or major modification to an
existing major source, is located in an area which meets the National Am-
bient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS).' 3 7 Areas in which the NAAQS
for a particular pollutant are met are called attainment areas.1 38 Areas in
which the NAAQS are not met are called nonattainment areas. 13 9 These
sources, when in an attainment area, are subject to the Prevention of Sig-
nificant Deterioration (PSD) program, 4 ° while sources in nonattainment
areas are subject to the nonattainment program. 14 1
a. The Prevention of Significant Deterioration Program142
In attainment areas, the Clean Air Act requires that new major
sources, and major modifications to existing major sources, obtain a Pre-
136. The amendment does not allow this percentage to be achieved with fuel changes
alone; it must involve the use of pollution abatement technology. Clean Air Act § 111, 42
U.S.C. § 7411 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
137. The Clean Air Act regulates ambient air pollutants in five main categories: carbon
monoxide, particulates, nitrogen oxides (NOx), sulfur oxides (SOx), and hydrocarbons
(HC). These pollutants, in certain concentrations, are considered a threat to public health
and welfare. Consequently, the Act directed EPA to establish standards for the presence
of these pollutants in the ambient air, called National Ambient Air Quality Standards
(NAAQS) in two ways. Clean Air Act § 109(a), 42 U.S.C. § 7409(a) (1988). First, EPA
was to set "primary" standards which, in the judgment of the EPA Administrator, "allowed
an adequate margin of safety ... requisite to protect the public health." Clean Air Act
§ 109(b)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1). The EPA Administrator was also directed to adopt
"secondary" standards which, in his or her judgment, were "requisite to protect the public
welfare [structures, crops, animals, fabrics, etc.] from any known or anticipated adverse
effect associated with the presence of such air pollutant in the ambient air." Clean Air Act
§ 109(b)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(2). The Clean Air Act also requires that every State
adopt a plan, called a "state implementation plan," (SIP) for implementing the NAAQS
primary standard in the state. Clean Air Act § 110, 42 U.S.C. § 7410 (1988 & Supp. V
1993).
138. Clean Air Act § 109, 42 U.S.C. § 7409 (1988).
139. Clean Air Act § 171, 42 U.S.C. § 7501(2) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
140. Clean Air Act §§ 160-169A, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7470-7491.
141. Clean Air Act §§ 171-178, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7501-7508.
142. Clean Air Act §§ 160-169, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7470-7479 (setting forth the PSD Program
requirements).
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vention of Significant Deterioration (PSD) permit.'43 To receive a PSD
permit, the owner or operator of a proposed new source must show that
the source will comply with ambient air quality levels designed to prevent
deterioration of air quality, called the "PSD increments." The owner
must also show that the proposed source will employ "best available con-
trol technology" '144 (BACT) for each pollutant regulated under the Clean
Air Act that it will emit in "significant"145 amounts. In addition, the PSD
permit applicant must show that the proposed source will not adversely
affect other air quality-related values, such as visibility.1
46
b. The Nonattainment Program147
In nonattainment areas, the Clean Air Act requires that new major
stationary sources, or major modifications to existing major sources, re-
ceive a nonattainment permit before beginning construction.' 48 In nonat-
tainment areas, existing (and therefore older) sources must employ
"reasonably available control technology,' 49 the least stringent standard
required under the Clean Air Act.' 5°
143. Clean Air Act § 165, 42 U.S.C. § 7475 (1988).
144. BACT is defined as the "maximum degree of [emission] reduction ... achievable,"
taking into account economic, energy, and environmental factors. Clean Air Act § 169A,
42 U.S.C. § 7491 (1988).
145. 40 C.F.R. § 52.21(b)(23) (1994) (providing "significant" levels for various pollu-
tants).
146. Clean Air Act § 169A, 42 U.S.C. § 7491 (1988).
147. Clean Air Act §§ 171-178, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7501-7508 (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (setting
forth requirements for the nonattainment program).
148. Clean Air Act § 172, 42 U.S.C. § 7502 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
149. Id.
150. In other situations the Clean Air Act requires, for example, "best available control
technology," or "maximum achievable control technology," both of which are more strin-
gent standards than the "reasonably available control technology" (RACT) applicable to
existing stationary sources. See PORTNEY, supra note 35, at 85. In mandatory RACT, Con-
gress sought to establish the lowest emission limit that a particular source is capable of
meeting by the application of control technology that is reasonably available considering
technological and economic feasibility.
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New major stationary sources'51 located in a nonattainment area, how-
ever, must obtain permits for construction and operation. 152 These per-
mits must contain standards more stringent than those required for the
older, existing sources located in the same nonattainment area, and are
subject to a much higher pollution control standard. To qualify for a
nonattainment permit, the new source must comply with the lowest
achievable emission rate (LAER). The LAER is based on the most strin-
gent emission limitation contained in any state implementation plan
(SIP), or achieved in practice by the same or a similar source category,
whichever is more stringent. 153 In addition, to help achieve ambient air
quality standards, these facilities must also satisfy certain offset require-
ments.154 This means that proposed new or modified major sources must
offset their potential to emit nonattainment pollutants by securing emis-
sion reductions from nearby facilities.'55
3. Modification and Reconstruction Rules
New source requirements apply not only to new sources of air pollutant
emissions, but also to major modifications,'56 or reconstructions of ex-
isting major sources.
a. Modification
Modification of an existing facility may trigger application of the PSD
or nonattainment permit program requirements as well as the applicable
151. A "new source" is "any stationary source the construction or modification of
which commenced after the effective date of the applicable regulations." Clean Air Act
§ 111(a)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(2) (1988). "[M]odification" of a source is "any physical
change in, or change in the method of operation of, a stationary source which increases the
amount of any air pollutant emitted or results in the emissions of a pollutant not previously
emitted." Id. § 7411(a)(4). A "stationary source" is "any building, structure, facility, or
installation which emits or may emit any air pollutant..." Id. § 7411(a)(3) (1988 & Supp.
V 1993).
152. The Clean Air Act requires that each state, in its implementation plan, require
permits for the construction and operation of new or modified major stationary sources
anywhere in the nonattainment area. Clean Air Act § 172(b)(5), 42 U.S.C. § 7502(b)(5).
153. Clean Air Act § 171, 42 U.S.C. § 7501. LAER is "the most stringent emission
limitation ... contained in the implementation plan of any state," unless the owner of the
proposed source demonstrates that the standard is unachievable, or is "the most stringent
emission limitation achieved in practice ... whichever is more stringent." Id.
154. Clean Air Act § 173(c), 42 U.S.C. § 7503(c) (Supp. V 1993).
155. See, e.g., Emissions Trading Policy Statement, 51 Fed. Reg. 43,814 (1986); 40
C.F.R. Part 51, App. S.
156. A "modification" of a major source is "any physical change in, or change in the
method of operation of, a stationary source which increases the amount of any air pollu-
tant emitted by such source or which results in the emission of any air pollutant not previ-
ously emitted." Id. §§ 7501(4), 7411(a)(4) (1988).
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NSPS's. Under the modification rule, a facility will be subject to these
other programs when there has been a physical or operational change at
the source, and this change results in an increase in emissions of a regu-
lated pollutant. In addition, the modification rule includes a list of spe-
cific activities which, when undertaken, do not amount to a modification
even if there is a physical or operational change that results in an increase
in emissions. Those activities include, for example, routine repair, re-
placement and maintenance. 15 7
b. Reconstruction
The reconstruction rule was designed to extend the useful life of ex-
isting industrial facilities.'58 The rule explains when a project to rebuild
an existing facility is so extensive that it is effectively a plan to replace the
facility "at the end of its useful life," as opposed to being a modification
of the facility. Basically, projects trigger the reconstruction rule when
they involve expenditures equal to 50% or more of the capital costs to
build a comparable new facility.' 59 The reconstruction rules only apply to
the NSPS program, not to the PSD or nonattainment programs. How-
ever, when a facility triggers the reconstruction rule, it does not necessar-
ily trigger application of an NSPS. Because an NSPS created for new
facilities may not be achievable by reconstructed facilities, an NSPS does
not apply to reconstructed facilities where it is shown to be technologi-
cally or economically unfeasible, or where the consideration of costs, re-
maining useful life, and potential emission reductions make it
inappropriate for NSPS to apply. 6° So, even here, reconstruction of
older facilities to make them more similar to and competitive with new
facilities may not subject them to the same regulatory standards.
4. Conclusion: Grandfather Clauses in the Clean Air Act
As shown above, the Clean Air Act, like RCRA, makes special provi-
sions for new sources of pollution. In particular, the Act sets forth spe-
157. For a more comprehensive analysis of the modification rule and its application, see
Wisconsin Elec. Power Co. v. Reilly, 893 F.2d 901 (7th Cir. 1990). Before the WEPCo
decision, the EPA made a series of decisions suggesting that virtually any activity designed
to restore lost capacity (e.g., a repair of a breakdown), that did not constitute routine re-
pair, replacement, or maintenance, would trigger NSPS's and must submit to preconstruc-
tion permit review. The court accepted EPA's position with respect to NSPS application,
but rejected much of EPA's position regarding PSD permit program applicability. EPA
promulgated a rule to address the WEPCo/modification rule problem in July 1992. See 57
Fed. Reg. 32314 (1992).
158. 40 Fed. Reg. 58,417 (1975); 40 C.F.R. § 60.15 (1995).
159. 40 C.F.R. § 60.15(b)(1) (1995).
160. 40 C.F.R. § 60.15(b)(2), (f) (1995).
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cific stringent provisions for facilities that qualify as major new sources of
air pollution. Although older sources are regulated, the regulations are
less stringent, as if Congress intended to focus its attention instead on
large future sources and major modifications of existing sources.
Although in the PSD program Congress professes to strive to prevent
significant deterioration, this is not the same as environmental improve-
ment. If Congress expended as much legislative energy on regulating
older, existing sources, one might see pollution levels drop in areas in-
fested with multiple existing polluting facilities.
C. Grandfather Clauses in Land Use and Zoning Law
Land use and zoning law serve as a third example of environmental law
in which grandfather clauses promote the continued operation of older
polluting facilities. This section will explain the general land use princi-
ples of "non-conforming use" and "natural expansion," and show that
these doctrines, in part because of their entrenchment in our system of
land use and zoning law, contribute to the continued operation, and even
expansion, of existing polluting facilities.
1. "Prior Non-Conforming Uses"
A long-standing doctrine in land use and zoning law states that prior
"non-conforming uses" may continue to operate in their current locations
despite changes in the zoning laws that would make them unable to move
into the area as a new facility.1 61 This means that if a polluting facility
was located and operational in its current location before the zoning laws
made that placement illegal, the facility is not required to leave the loca-
tion.162 In short, a particular land use is "nonconforming when, although
originally lawful, it no longer complies with [the community's] new or
amended zoning legislation.' 16
3
161. Note that although zoning laws are sometimes used as environmental "grandfather
clauses," some changes in zoning laws are used to get certain land uses, such as establish-
ments of pornography, or other locally undesirable land uses (LULUs) out of an area.
This point is beyond the scope of this Article and will not be addressed here.
162. See, e.g., Hempfield Township v. Hapchuk, 620 A.2d 668, 671-72 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
1993), appeal denied, 644 A.2d 165 (Pa. 1994), in which the owners of a 170 acre property,
originally zoned agricultural, but for which the zoning was amended to make the property
part agricultural and part residential, were permitted to continue spreading sewage sludge
as an agricultural practice on the residential portion of the property because the amend-
ment to the existing zoning ordinance did not mandate discontinuance of an existing non-
conforming use. In Hapchuk, the court confirmed the long-standing rule that zoning
ordinances apply prospectively only. Id. at 672.
163. Barry Gosin, Note, Pennsylvania Northwestern Distributors, Inc. v. Zoning Hear-
ing Board of Moon Township: Amortization of Nonconforming Uses or Amortization of
the Police Power in Pennsylvania?, 37 VILL. L. Rnv. 161 (1992).
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For the environmental justice movement, this is of particular interest as
it applies to hazardous waste facilities and other polluting facilities which
have been held to have vested rights to continue their operations. For
example, an older landfill in lawful operation will, in many states, be al-
lowed to continue operating as a nonconforming use after the enactment
of an ordinance which would prohibit a similar new landfill from opening
on the same site.' 64 As such, land use law's doctrine of 'non-conforming
use,' although not statutory, functions as a grandfather clause.
2. The "Natural Expansion" Doctrine
The "natural expansion doctrine," essentially an extension of the prin-
ciple of nonconforming use, is applicable in some states. It requires mu-
nicipalities to allow prior nonconforming uses to expand or make
additions to their property to accommodate increased business, or natural
expansion. 165 In addition, an operator of a nonconforming use may in-
164. Gerrard, supra note 16, at 1100. Gerrard cites Niagara Recycling, Inc., v. Town of
Niagara, 443 N.Y.S.2d 939 (N.Y. App. Div. 1981) (allowing the continuance of a prior non-
conforming use) and Clean Harbors of Braintree, Inc. v. Braintree Bd. of Health, 570
N.E.2d 987 (Mass. 1991) (reaching a contrary result). Clean Harbors of Braintree began
operating a hazardous waste treatment and storage facility in Braintree, Massachusetts in
1976. Clean Harbors, 570 N.E.2d at 988. At that time, Massachusetts law required a site
assignment for "works for treating or disposing of ... all solid or liquid waste material."
MASS. GEN. L. ch. 111, § 150A (1983 & Supp. 1995). Clean Harbors never sought a site
assignment and the Town of Braintree took no action with regard to the omission until
1985. Clean Harbors, 570 N.E.2d at 988. In 1980, the Massachusetts legislature enacted a
provision that expanded the site assignment requirements to cover virtually all facilities
treating, storing or disposing of hazardous waste, and excluding such facilities from cover-
age under § 150A. MASS. GEN. L. ch. 111, § 150B. As part of that same legislation, the
legislature enacted the Massachusetts Hazardous Waste Facility Siting Act which
grandfathered facilities already possessing approvals from the Department of Environmen-
tal Protection. Clean Harbors relied on the grandfather clause in § 150B to argue that the
legislature intended, but neglected, to include a grandfather clause in the siting law. Clean
Harbors, 570 N.E.2d at 989. In Clean Harbors, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
refused to create a grandfather clause in the siting law where the legislature had not writ-
ten one into the statute. Id. at 989-90. It found that although "the purpose of [section
150B] was to increase hazardous waste treatment capacity in the Commonwealth, a judi-
cially manufactured grandfather clause is not necessary to achieve that end." Id. at 989.
The Massachusetts legislature, in response to the Clean Harbors decision, created legisla-
tion exempting any existing hazardous waste incinerators from municipal approval require-
ments. Clean Harbors of Braintree Inc. v. Braintree Bd. of Health, 616 N.E.2d 78, 83 n.4
(1993); see also CECOS Int'l, Inc. v. Jorling, 895 F.2d 66, 72-74 (2d Cir. 1990) (upholding a
New York state statute repealing an exemption for expansions of existing commercial land-
fills that had previously existed in the state siting laws).
165. Jan Alan Lewis, "Don't 'Tread' on Me", 19 REAL EST. L.J. 265 (1991); but see
Warner Co. v. Zoning Hearing Bd. of Tredyffrin Township, 612 A.2d 578, 582-83 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1992) (holding that the doctrine of natural expansion did not bar a township
from enacting an ordinance which established reasonable setback requirements on quarry-
ing activity, despite prior use of the site as a quarry), appeal denied, 624 A.2d 112 (Pa.
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corporate modern technology into that use without running afoul of its
status as a prior nonconforming use. 166 The expansion may only extend,
however, over the portion of land used for the nonconforming purpose at
the time the relevant ordinance was enacted.167 The hypothetical landfill
operating in nonconforming use, discussed above, may have the good for-
tune of increased business and a need to expand its operations. To do so,
it would need to meet the applicable state law on expansion of non-con-
forming uses.
III. WHY Do WE GRANDFATHER?
Grandfather clauses have been tools for rearranging rights since their
inception in the voting laws of the late nineteenth century. They allow
legislators to adopt stringent legislation, yet delay its application, or apply
it selectively, based on existing conditions. Grandfather clauses facilitate
legislators' consideration of issues of fairness and issues of politics, pro-
tection of investment, and, in the case of environmental regulation, pres-
ervation of disposal or storage capacity for pollutants or hazardous
wastes. Grandfather clauses enable legislators to create two-tiered sys-
tems of regulation and apply them according to the history of applicable
rights, regulations, or regulated parties. Legislators can create stringent,
immediately applicable legislation, exempt some from its applicability
through the use of grandfather clauses, and in doing so, perhaps avoid
adverse consequences at the polls. As such, legislators can meet the pub-
lic's needs while avoiding some of its wrath.
Congress may have incorporated grandfather clauses into environmen-
tal laws to insulate existing facilities from the financial burden of immedi-
1993); see also In re Gillifan's Permit, 140 A. 136, 137-38 (Pa. 1927) (originally promulgat-
ing and explaining the doctrine of natural expansion in Pennsylvania).
166. Lewis, supra note 165, at 267.
167. Township of Chartiers v. William H. Martin, Inc., 542 A.2d 985, 989 (Pa. 1988). In
one example, an expansion was 'natural' because it was clear that the portion of the lot on
which the landowner sought to expand his garage had been "an integral part of the prop-
erty used in the furtherance of the nonconforming purpose." In re Pierce, 119 A.2d 506,
510 (Pa. 1956). In the landfill context, however, the doctrine of natural expansion might
only allow an owner of a landfill operating as a prior nonconforming use "to extend the
scope of his nonconforming use over the portion of his lot devoted to his lawful business
purpose at the time of the ordinance." Piecknick v. South Strabane Township Zoning Hear-
ing Bd., 607 A.2d 829, 835 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1992). Thus, if a landfill only occupied a
portion of a larger piece of land, only that part of the land on which the landfill was operat-
ing could benefit from the doctrine of natural expansion. Land not used for the business
purpose at the time of the zoning ordinance would not be subject to the doctrine. Id. at
836.
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ate compliance with more stringent environmental standards. 168 For
example, with respect to RCRA enactment, Congress feared that by re-
quiring existing facilities to meet the new siting and technology standards,
most would have to shut down, leaving too few facilities available for
hazardous waste disposal.169 The result of this fear is the two-tiered regu-
latory system that exists under RCRA.170 This type of policy decision, on
the part of both Congress and state legislatures, is common in environ-
mental law.
17
Congress may also have created regulation that includes grandfather
clauses in keeping with a consistent statutory pattern. Historically, legis-
lators have distinguished between "old" and "new", especially with re-
gard to various sources of risk.'72 Similarly, grandfather clauses in
168. See H.R. 24, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995); H.R. 225 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995)
(bills that would allow states to exert flow control over solid waste). One major issue in
the debate over this legislation is that the bills would grandfather pre-existing solid waste
disposal facilities, while prohibiting flow control for new facilities. It is the scope, not pres-
ence, of the grandfather clause that is currently at issue. See Interstate Transportation of
Solid Waste and Flow Control: Hearings on Flow Control Before the Subcomm. on
Superfund, Waste Control, and Risk Assessment, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) (statement of
Edward C. Farrell, Executive Dir. of the New York State Conference of Mayors and Mu-
nicipal Officials), available in WESTLAW 1995 WL 81542 (F.D.C.H.).
169. See Gerrard, supra note 16, at 1100 (citing MARC K. LANDY ET. AL, THE ENVI-
RONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY: ASKING THE WRONG QUESTIONS 109 (1990)). Also
with respect to RCRA, Congress believed that the EPA could not issue permits to all
hazardous waste applicants before RCRA became effective and therefore provided the
interim status benefit to facilities in existence on November 19, 1980. See EPA v. Environ-
mental Waste Control, Inc., 710 F. Supp. 1172, 1182 (N.D. Ind. 1989), aff'd, 917 F.2d 327
(7th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 975 (1991). With respect to the Clean Air Act, "Con-
gress expressed concern that the costs of retrofitting existing sources [of air pollution] with
state-of-the-art [pollution] control technologies could be prohibitively expensive," and con-
cluded that "it would be more cost-effective to require high levels of technological per-
formance at new sources" because of their flexibility in design and location.
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW HANDBOOK 120, 127 (12th ed. 1993) (citing S. REP. No. 91-1196,
91st Cong., 2d Sess. 15-16 (1970)).
170. See supra notes 42-56 and accompanying text.
171. Gerrard, supra note 16, at 1100 n.360.
172. See Huber, supra note 123, at 1025. Huber characterizes "old" risks as "the devils
we know" and contrasts them with "new" risks, or "the ominous unknown." Id. He argues
that an "old risk-new risk double standard pervades regulatory statutes and decisions con-
struing them," and analyzes the distinction between them on economic and political
grounds. Id. Huber also contends that by allowing "old" risks to operate at lower stan-
dards, we allow them to continue to operate longer and by stringently regulating "new"
risks, inhibit their creation, which may be less dangerous than the known risk. Id. at 1053.
Huber notes that this double standard is especially evident in the areas of food and drug
regulation, but also exists in environmental and occupational safety and health regulation.
Id. at 1025-26. In his analysis of "old" and "new" risks, Huber refers mostly to "old" risks
as those to which society has already been widely exposed. Id. at 1026. These are often
associated with products already on the market, such as a food, drug or automobile tech-
nology. Id. In contrast, "new" risks would be those with which society is not readily famil-
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environmental laws allow old risks to persist, but enable new risks to be
regulated in a more categorical and sweeping manner.
173
Finally, legislators may have created this system in keeping with gen-
eral notions of fairness, to help investors protect investments in polluting
facilities, or to enable themselves to enact stringent legislation while de-
laying potentially negative constituent or industry reaction. Some legisla-
tors have even used grandfather clauses as a form of revenge or
protectionism.174 Regardless of the reasons for the emergence or exist-
ence of grandfather clauses, these provisions continue to create and for-
tify inequities in the treatment of polluting facilities. In addition, they
foster disparate environmental circumstances among racial groups, just as
they encouraged inequity in the voting rights laws of the nineteenth
century. 175
Thus, there are numerous reasons grandfather clauses exist in law in
general, and, in particular, in environmental law. But, as illustrated
above, grandfather clauses have effectively created two-tiers of environ-
mental regulation. 176 This inequity in environmental regulation, accord-
ing to the age of the facility, is symptomatic of the two-tiered
environmental regulatory scheme. Yet, ironically, although many argu-
ments support the creation and continued existence of grandfather
clauses that create and maintain the resulting inequities, fairness is the
strongest and most widely used among them.
Because fairness is the strongest and most prevalent argument support-
ing the use of grandfather clauses, this section addresses it and explains
that it is an equally strong argument against the use of grandfather
clauses in the environmental law context. Second, this section will con-
sider the grandfather clause's role in investment in polluting facilities.
iar, such as a nuclear power plant or a new aircraft design. Id. He asserts that the public is
less afraid of what they know, so those risks are less stringently regulated than those risks
they do not know, which are therefore more stringently regulated. Id.; cf. Peter Huber,
Safety and the Second Best: The Hazards of Public Risk Management in the Courts, 85
COLUM. L. REV. 277 (1985) (dealing with the related issue of the regulatory treatment of
public risks as opposed to private risks).
173. See Huber, supra note 123, at 1041-42. Huber contends that the substantive conse-
quence of this distinction is that "agencies regulate old risks less stringently than new ones,
and protect the established expectations of entrenched practices more carefully than evolv-
ing aspirations and innovations." Id. at 1042. This contention makes sense with respect to
environmental grandfather clauses because those clauses operate, under this theory, to al-
low less stringent regulation of "old environmental risks" where those known risks can
continue to function according to the expectations and practices of their owners.
174. Jerry Knight, A Night To Play 'Let's Make A Deal', WASH. POST, Nov. 28, 1991, at
Al (stating that Congress creates loopholes and introduces grandfather clauses to protect
something from reform).
175. See discussion supra notes 3-6 and accompanying text.
176. See supra notes 42-57 and accompanying text.
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Third, it will consider how grandfather clauses affect the preservation of
capacity to dispose of waste. Finally, this section will address some of the
politics of grandfathering and potentially perverse results created when
legislators place too much emphasis on one side of the fairness argument
by employing grandfather clauses in environmental legislation.
A. Fairness: On Both Sides of the Fence
Fairness, equity, and justice are often used to rationalize the distribu-
tion of society's harms or benefits. The body of law regarding what is
fair, termed "equity," has a rich and mythic history in this country. 177
Equity, by definition, concerns inherent fairness to individuals, even in
the absence of a "fair," clear-cut policy established by the representative
majority. 178 As such, "equity" clearly should be a primary motivating
theory of a movement seeking to redistribute environmental risk and
harm to shift a disproportionate burden away from politically under-
represented groups. At the same time, equity is also a primary rationale
supporting the continued inclusion of grandfather clauses in modern leg-
islation. Equity also demands fairness in the form of relief to those
harmed by impending legislation or regulation, in the absence of grandfa-
ther clauses. At least one economist, however, argues that "[r]hetoric
about fairness tends (quite mistakenly) to 'grandfather in' special privi-
leges" in circumstances where the real inequity lies in the protectionism
that led to the grandfather clause.' 79
177. Michael Andrew O'Hara, The Utilization of Caveat Emptor in CERCLA Private
Party Cleanups, 56 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 149, 158 (1993).
178. Id. at 158-59. To explain this principle of equity, O'Hara cites Edward Re ex-
panding on Zechariah Chaffee, Jr.'s definition of "equity" as:
[A] way of looking at the administration of justice, the goal is to do justice in the
particular case. It implies a liberating influence which mitigates the rigidity of
formal rules. Its aim is to achieve an individualization of justice. In this sense,
equity is that part of our legal heritage that has given the law an ethical dimen-
sion. In extolling the virtues of candor and good faith, it reaffirms the moral
element of a just society.
Id. at 159.
179. Steven E. Landsburg, The Sins of the Grandfathers, FORBES, Feb. 13, 1995, at 85.
Landsburg uses a town reassessment of his own property taxes to explain his position. Id.
The reassessment led to an increase of 40% in Landsburg's property taxes, while his neigh-
bor's assessment did not change. Id. He argues that the unfairness lies, not in his in-
creased assessment as compared to his neighbors unchanged assessment, but in the fact
that his own taxes were probably actually disproportionately low for the past 15 years. Id.
According to Landsburg's neighbor, Landsburg should be making a large donation to the
town treasury, along with the increased assessment, to make-up for the past inequity. Id.
Landsburg applies the same principle to U.S. workers who complain about their loss of a
$16-an-hour job to a $3-an-hour Mexican worker. Id. Under his analysis, consumers have
been paying $16 for something they should have been able to get for $3-and the U.S.
worker ought, therefore, to have a portion of his assets confiscated to pay for the past
1995]
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The principles of fairness, justice, and equity are important in this con-
text because they have at least two potential positions in the analysis.
First, these principles are important to the history of grandfather clauses.
They help explain why some legislators created them originally, and per-
haps more importantly, why legislators continue to use them. Second,
although beyond the scope of this Article, the principles of fairness, jus-
tice and equity are important factors in determining how to redistribute
inequitably distributed risk."' °
According to some contemporary philosophers, "justice" is "fairness"
made up of two principles.181 The first is liberty. 82 Without it, there can
be no fairness and therefore no justice.'83 The second principle is that
social and economic inequalities must be arranged so that they are both
to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged, and attached to offices and
positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity.'84
This concept of justice as fairness is an example of an appropriate plat-
form from which environmental justice advocates might make their case,
and again, an apparent rationale for the inclusion of modern grandfather
clauses in environmental and other legislation.
185
inequity imposed on the U.S. consumer. Id. Landsburg notes, however, that this rational,
intellectual case against grandfathering cannot hope to overcome the political power of
entrenched bureaucracies. Id.
180. Some calls for environmental justice are, in effect, calls for "equality." Been,
supra, note 24, at 1006. Been argues that environmental justice advocates commonly
choose "to advance general concepts of equality, rather than endanger their coalition by
attempting to specify the precise content of " 'justice,' 'equity' or 'fairness.' " Id. Peter
Westen has noted that "equality in the end is a rhetorical device that tends to persuade
precisely by virtue of 'cloak[ing] strongly divergent ideas over which people do in fact
disagree.'" PETER WESTEN, SPEAKING OF EOUALITY 270-71 (1990) (quoting Charles
Frankel, Equality of Opportunity, 81 ETHICS 192 (1971)).
181. For a more comprehensive look at various philosophical constructs of justice, see
TOM CAMPBELL, JUSTICE (1988). For purposes of this analysis, I have concentrated on
"justice" as "fairness" because fairness is the principal and strongest argument that both
proponents and opponents of grandfather clauses might use.
182. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 60, 250 (1971).
183. Id. at 60-61.
184. Id. at 60, 250. Rawls argues that of the two principles of justice as fairness, rational
deliberators would give the first principle, that of liberty, absolute priority. It is these two
principles, and the priority principle that make up Rawls' fundamental conception of jus-
tice. See id.
185. Some will argue that Rawls' theory of justice does not apply in this context as it is
intended to "address[ ] the design of fair institutional structures, not the fairness of individ-
ual distributional choices." Been, supra note 24, at 1048. However, environmental justice
advocates justifiably might argue that the siting and other decisions which lead to circum-
stances of environmental injustice, including the creation and maintenance of environmen-
tal grandfather clauses, are not individual distributional choices, but systemic, even
institutionally entrenched systems of unfairness to which Rawls' theory of justice should
apply.
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To apply the justice as fairness principles to environmental grandfather
clauses within the environmental justice movement, one must first ad-
dress the question of liberty. Environmental grandfather clauses help es-
tablish and perpetuate environmental harm in low-income, minority
communities. These communities often do not truly have liberty to make,
or significantly influence, decisions regarding their environmental wel-
fare. This is partly because they tend to be politically underrepresented,
and partly because of the inherent racial discrimination that still exists
and hampers the ability of residents of these communities to leave or
change their circumstances.18 6
The second principle of justice as fairness requires analysis of the ar-
rangement of social and economic inequalities. The arrangement of so-
cial and economic inequalities must provide the greatest benefit to the
least advantaged. If one accepts the premise that low-income, minority
communities are among the least advantaged in our society, and that they
suffer a disproportionate burden of environmental harm, the use of envi-
ronmental grandfather clauses certainly is not providing the greatest ben-
efit to the least advantaged. In addition, these communities do not have
the equality of opportunity required to fulfill the second principle of jus-
tice as fairness.187 For failing to meet these principles, one might argue
that use of environmental grandfather clauses to the disproportionate dis-
advantage of low-income, minority communities is unfair and therefore
unjust.
One could, however, apply the same analysis to the other side of the
debate. Under the first principle of justice as fairness, owners of pollut-
ing facilities are not really at liberty to affect the rules by which they must
operate their facilities. In other words, owners are at liberty to partici-
pate in the democratic process, but the creation of environmental regula-
tions is removed sufficiently from the democratic process that owners
may not be truly at liberty to affect the regulations that apply to them.
Next, one applies the second principle, concerning the arrangement of
social and economic inequalities. Again, the principle requires that those
inequalities be arranged such that they are to the greatest benefit of the
least advantaged. In terms of providing the greatest benefit to the least
advantaged, one could argue that no party is less or more advantaged in
terms of allocating the greatest good of environmental regulation. In ad-
186. See Austin & Schill, supra note 28, at 76-78 (explaining that African-Americans
and Hispanics have greater difficulty leaving environmentally undesirable locations in part
because of racially-based housing discrimination); see also Cole, supra note 34, at 628-29;
James T. Hamilton, Politics and Social Cost: Estimating the Impact of Collective Action on
Hazardous Waste Facilities, 24 RAND J. ECON. 101, 115-18 (1993).
187. See Cole, supra note 34, at 628-29.
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dition, in terms of influence within the political process, large industry
certainly is more influential than low-income minority community groups,
while small business may be as disadvantaged in terms of political repre-
sentation and influence as underrepresented communities. So, based on
a cursory discussion of "justice as fairness" applied in an environmental
equity scenario, fairness does apply to both sides of the grandfather
clause debate.188
In modern practical terms, grandfather clauses have, for example, al-
lowed people to consume alcohol if they had reached the age of majority
(for purposes of alcohol consumption) before the law was amended to
raise the operative age.189 The rationale for this, sound or not, was that if
a person was legally allowed to drink alcohol on one day because she had
reached the age of majority, it seemed fair to allow her to continue to
drink alcoholic beverages when the law changed.19° This demonstrates
adherence to the "don't change the rules in mid-game" theory of legisla-
tive fairness.' 9 '
188. This analysis of fairness is intended merely to illustrate the point that the argument
cuts both ways in any discussion of whether grandfather clauses should be used in environ-
mental regulation. This Article does not attempt to chronicle or analyze all of the various
theories of fairness or justice that might be applicable. Instead, it attempts to illustrate the
role of fairness in the debate over the use of environmental grandfather clauses. For a
comprehensive discussion of fairness applied in the environmental justice context, see
Been, supra note 24.
Vicki Been analyzes the meaning of fairness and then looks at the theoretical bases for
fair siting proposals. Id. at 1008. In doing so, she examines fairness in the pattern of distri-
bution of locally undesirable land uses (LULUs), and considers compensation and other
systems as possibilities for redistributing LULUs. Id. She also looks at the various types
of equality that may come to play in devising a system for redistributing LULUs: equality
of treatment or equality of results. Id. Been does not attempt to survey accounts of justice
she considers "too indeterminant to guide fairness in siting, such as theories of highest total
or average utility." Id. at 1027 n.133.
189. D'Vera Cohn, George Mason U. Bans Sale of Alcohol at Outdoor Events, WASH.
POST, Sept. 11, 1986, at C5.
190. Sandra Evans, D.C. Raises Drinking Age to 21, WASH. POST, Sept. 24,1986, at Al.
The District of Columbia City Council voted to approve a bill raising the drinking age to
21, provided that it grandfathered in persons already 18. Id. D.C. Council Chairman
David A. Clarke defended the grandfather clause as necessary to be fair to young persons
who already have been able to drink in the city, asking "[h]ow can you tell somebody they
can drink when they become 18, and then say at 19 they can't?" Id. at A19. The bill
increased the drinking age to 21 as of September 30, 1986, but allowed persons who were
18 by that day to drink beer and wine. Id. at Al.
191. Fairness has been cited as a reason for the institution of grandfather clauses in
many circumstances. See, e.g., John Swades, Hillside Builders Get Exemptions, L.A.
TIMES, Aug. 3, 1990, at B3 (explaining that the L.A. City Planning Commission President
Ted Stein voted for a grandfather clause in a new zoning ordinance "because he was con-
cerned about the fairness of changing the rules of the game for developers who were al-
ready in the city planning approval process").
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This same principle of fairness also applies, for example, to an oil refin-
ery built in accordance with the standards that applied when it was con-
structed. This refinery might well have operated in accordance with those
standards for years, when the rules changed to increase the stringency of
the operating requirements. Without a protective grandfather clause, the
facility may have to shut down or incur great expense to reconstruct or
modify in accordance with the new rules. With the protection of a grand-
father clause, it remains in operation, continuing to pollute the surround-
ing community at lower standards of environmental regulation. While
players on either side of this debate will disagree about whether this is a
good or bad outcome, certainly both sides could use the fairness argu-
ment to support their position.
Hence, considerations of fairness weigh on both sides of the debate
over the use of grandfather clauses in environmental laws. They support
strong arguments against the use of environmental grandfather clauses, to
create a more racially, economically and demographically equitable dis-
tribution of environmental risk. They also support the historical and con-
tinued creation and use of environmental grandfather clauses by
legislators and regulators to protect the interests and investments of in-
dustry and their constituents.
B. The Impact of Grandfather Clauses on Investment
Failure of legislatures to enact grandfather clauses in the face of chang-
ing regulation may have various adverse effects on present and future
investment. For example, failure to enact a protective grandfather clause
while regulations become more stringent might cause recent investors in
regulated industries to cry foul because their expectations have been
compromised. Similarly, ungrandfathered regulation could discourage
future investment in regulated industries by acting as a disincentive for
potential future investors. These potential investors may see unpredict-
able changes in regulation as creating prohibitive expenses for which they
are unable to prepare.192
Often owners or investors in a polluting facility have invested time,
energy, and above all, money, in a facility which met all applicable envi-
ronmental standards when it was built. Then the applicable laws change.
To comply with the new laws, the facility would have to invest in and
install pollution control technologies that may far exceed the standards
for which the facility originally was built. These installations might be
192. See Louis Kaplow, An Economic Analysis of Legal Transitions, 99 HARv. L. REV.
509, 525-26 (1986) (arguing that "[p]erceptive investors will typically act on probability
estimates of possible changes in the legal regime").
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Catholic University Law Review
extremely costly. They might even require significant modification of the
facility itself. If the new rules applied immediately, or even at all, the
viability of the facility and the investment could be jeopardized. By al-
lowing existing facilities to work under less stringent environmental stan-
dards, or in some cases under the environmental standards that applied
when the facilities were originally permitted, legislators are "fairly" or
"equitably" protecting major investments of their constituents under a
fairness rationale based on the expectation of those investors. 193
Likewise, if the regulatory rules of the game are subject to constant
change without protection from grandfather clauses, prospective inves-
tors reasonably could fear that a regulatory change could render a poten-
tially profitable investment less profitable or even unprofitable. Their
fear that a facility may face significant rebuilding or retrofitting to comply
with future rules unprotected by grandfathered status surely would dis-
courage investment.194 The legislative practice of grandfathering existing
facilities may not only protect current investment, but may also operate
as an incentive to future investment in regulated industries.
C. Grandfather Clauses and the Preservation of Capacity
In the environmental arena, the imposition of stringent standards on
polluting facilities could lead to the closure of some important facilities.
Some facility owners might decide that compliance with new regulation is
too onerous and instead opt for closure. For landfills, incinerators and
other waste disposal facilities where there may be an acute shortage, clo-
sure can create insurmountable problems for the communities served by
those facilities.195 Legislators might conclude that it is more responsible
to allow some existing facilities to operate under less stringent standards,
rather than lose the capacity they provide, especially given the increasing
difficulty in siting newer, cleaner replacement facilities.
193. A related issue of concern to legislators' constituents is the preservation of em-
ployment opportunities. Although most legislators are probably moved more by the con-
cerns of big investors, the employees of polluting facilities are also voters in their districts
and may want to keep polluting facilities open to preserve their jobs. Legislators' use of
grandfather clauses to keep these facilities operating longer, or under protected status, may
mask, for constituents, the fact that regulations are changing. Because a grandfather clause
can protect the facility, at least for a limited duration, constituents employed at the facility
may not become aware that the legislators changed the regulations applicable to the plant.
194. Kaplow, supra note 192, at 525-26.
195. Some commentators would argue that acute capacity shortages do not exist for
landfills, incinerators and other waste disposal facilities, except for certain special cases,
such as those designed for storing radioactive waste. See Gerrard, supra note 16, at 1104-
06 (contending that, from an economic standpoint, there is no severe shortage of hazard-
ous waste facilities).
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D. Politics and Grandfathering
The political nature of representative democracy provides another po-
tential answer to the question of why legislators use the grandfather
clause mechanism, despite its potential for inequitable results. Because
legislators represent not only resident constituents, but also special inter-
est groups, some forms of regulation simply would not be politically
palatable without protective grandfather clauses. The practice of
grandfathering, in a sense, "buys off" those who might be most adversely
affected by regulation. It places the cost of the compliance burden on
future actors-those who may not be aware that they will be affected,
and therefore cannot combat the regulatory enactment. Grandfathering
allows legislators to deal with the costs of regulation and resistance to
regulation by imposing the costs on future actors, and avoiding the resist-
ance through the ignorance of those who will be affected.
The result is that legislators may be able to enact legislation which,
without the inclusion of a protective grandfather clause, would be politi-
cally impossible. Legislators would be lobbied heavily by those subject to
the legislation's stringent regulatory impact, to the extent that legislation
leading to stringent regulation would not arise or become law. By using
grandfather clauses as a political tool, legislators can create forward-
thinking legislation that has its regulatory impact on future "generations"
of polluters. The result is a positive future impact, but an abandonment
of the current environment. Of course, the downside of this use of grand-
father clauses lies in their negative attributes: inequitable protectionism
and continued inequitable distribution of environmental risk.
E. Potentially Perverse Results of Grandfathering
In addition to their resultant unfairness and disproportionate impact,
grandfather clauses confer a perverse advantage on older facilities. The
combination of creating an exemption for older facilities by allowing
them to remain subject to less stringent standards of environmental regu-
lation, and creating costly regulatory requirements for newer facilities,
gives a distinct advantage to older, dirtier facilities in their competition
with newer cleaner counterparts. 196 Thus, older facilities benefit at the
expense of newer facilities, which create less pollution.
Also, in part because of the benefits they receive from grandfather
clauses, older polluting facilities are likely to remain in use longer than
they might have in the absence of increased regulation. In fact, it is often
196. Id. at 1098 (explaining that "[o]f the twenty-one commercial [hazardous waste]
landfills operating today... only one is on a site selected since the enactment of RCRA in
1976").
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easier for companies to continue operating existing facilities, and even to
expand them, than it is to create new facilities subject to the more strin-
gent regulations.197 This result may increase the total amount of pollu-
tion emitted (if we assume that newer facilities would be cleaner even
without increased regulation) or at the very least, slow increases in pro-
ductivity or other improvements that result from capital investment.
IV. SOME SOLUTIONS TO THE PROBLEM OF ENVIRONMENTAL
GRANDFATHER CLAUSES
Environmental justice literature, especially that which appears in the
law reviews, has been criticized for its failure to provide feasible solutions
to environmental inequity. However, the literature has offered numerous
suggestions. 198 While most agree that judicial remedies are inadequate,
some suggest statutory approaches' 99 and an increasing number suggest a
closer look at civil rights law.2"' Unlike these approaches, this Article
focuses on remedies specific to the problem of environmental grandfather
clauses. If the unfairness created by these clauses can be reduced or elim-
inated, the resulting more equitable treatment of facilities of different
ages should, at least in part, begin to reverse one of the causes of environ-
mental inequity. In fact, the reduction or elimination of environmental
grandfather clauses should reduce, not only racial and socio-economic in-
equity with respect to the regulation of polluting facilities, but also gen-
eral inequity in the standards that apply to similar polluting facilities of
different ages.
To that end, this section addresses the potential use of outright un-
grandfathering of facilities that benefit from the protection of environ-
mental grandfather clauses, creation of amortization provisions, and
implementation of sunset provisions to create termination points for ex-
isting grandfathered benefits.2 ' In addition, this section will attempt to
address some potential criticisms of these proposed remedies.
197. Id. at 1100.
198. See Robert W. Collin, Environmental Equity: A Law and Planning Approach to
Environmental Racism, 11 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 495,537 (1992) (arguing that minorities may be
economically less able to use the judiciary to remedy environmental inequity); Robert W.
Collin, Review of the Legal Literature on Environmental Racism, Environmental Equity,
and Environmental Justice, 9 J. ENVTL. L. & LrrIG. 121,166 (1994) (noting that "[t]here is a
consensus in the law review literature that judicial remedies are insufficient").
199. See Samara F. Swanston, Legal Strategies for Achieving Environmental Equity, 18
YALE J. INT'L. L. 337 (1993).
200. See James H. Colopy, The Road Less Traveled: Pursuing Environmental Justice
Through Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 13 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 125 (1994).
201. Each of these suggested remedies for the problem of environmental grandfather
clauses involves a form of legal transition or transformation of the laws governing polluting
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A. Outright Ungrandfathering-CECOS
In western New York, environmental justice advocates will find an ex-
ample of a previously grandfathered facility which, upon becoming "un-
grandfathered," became subject to and failed environmental standards
required for it to remain in operation. What began as a solid waste dispo-
sal facility in the late nineteenth century had become, by 1976, one of two
commercial hazardous waste facilities in New York. 2 ' The facility, oper-
ated by CECOS International, Inc. (CECOS), °3 handled, with one other
commercial facility, 20 4 eighty percent of the 280,000 tons of hazardous
waste produced annually in New York state.205 To handle the large
amount of hazardous waste it collected, CECOS sequentially operated
five separate Secure Chemical Management Facilities (SCMF), or hazard-
ous waste landfills, at the Niagara facility.2 °6 As one SCMF was filled,
CECOS would open and begin disposing waste into the next SCMF. By
1990, CECOS had filled all five existing SCMFs to capacity and they were
no longer operational.
Anticipating the closure of its five SCMFs, CECOS began developing,
in 1984, plans for a sixth landfill and filed an initial application for it in
May 1985.207 In response to CECOS' application the Department of En-
vironmental Conservation (DEC) requested additional information in a
series of Notices of Incomplete Information. 20 8 The information-gather-
ing process continued for two years, after which DEC issued a draft per-
mit for a sixth SCMF.20 9 A hearing on the permit began, but was
postponed "pending the parties' submission of briefs on the issue of
whether the siting law, as originally enacted, exempted CECOS from sit-
ing board review.- 210
facilities. This Article does not attempt to handle the various impacts of legal transitions.
For a comprehensive discussion of legal transitions, see Kaplow, supra note 192.
202. CECOS Int'l, Inc. v. Jorling, 895 F.2d 66, 68 (2d Cir. 1990).
203. CECOS stands for Chemical and Environmental Conservation Systems. Proper
Disposal Requires Money and Land, BOST. GLOBE, May 27, 1980, at 19. CECOS accepts
waste from all over the Northeast that lesser equipped plants cannot handle. CECOS is a
subsidiary of Browning-Ferris Industries, Inc., of Houston, Texas. Paul MacClennan, The
New BFI Cleans Up its Image, BUFF. NEWS, Mar. 10, 1991, at B9; GM, Landfills May Be
Fined $35 Million in PCB Disposal: EPA Says Sludge with High Levels of Toxicant Buried,
ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Mar. 19, 1991, at A3.
204. Chemical Waste Management Inc. is a subsidiary of Waste Management Inc. Mac-
Clennan, supra note 203, at B10. In waste management, Browning-Ferris ranks second in
size to Waste Management Inc., "which is about twice the size of BFI." Id. at B10.
205. CECOS Int'l, 895 F.2d at 68.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id.
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During the two-year information-gathering period, the New York legis-
lature passed an amendment to the laws governing the siting of hazardous
waste disposal facilities.211 Prior to the amendment, CECOS argued that
it fell within a grandfather clause exempting it from the requirement to
obtain a Certificate of Environmental Safety and Public Necessity from
the siting review board.212 The original law had included what amounted
to a grandfather clause exempting from the certificate requirement haz-
ardous waste landfill operators seeking to expand an existing facility.213
However, the new amendment eliminated commercial land disposal facil-
ities like CECOS from the grandfather exemption, thereby requiring
them to obtain a certificate.214
To reopen the administrative hearing on its application for a permit for
its sixth landfill, CECOS renewed its application in November 1987 and,
as required, "includ[ed] a request for a certificate from the siting
board.,,2 15 Although the Administrative Law Judge recommended that
the siting board and Commissioner grant CECOS a certificate and permit
for its sixth landfill, those documents were never issued.216 In March
1990, the siting board rejected the CECOS application for a site certifica-
tion, foreclosing all possibility that CECOS could receive a permit to con-
struct and operate the sixth landfill at its current location under the new
law. Thus, the effective "ungrandfathering" of the CECOS facility with
respect to the siting certification requirement, combined with certain
characteristics of the site itself, essentially caused CECOS to discontinue
its operation at its current location.
211. Id. In 1987, the New York legislature amended the siting law to require siting
board certification, not only for new hazardous waste facilities, but also for expansions of
existing commercial landfills. Act of Aug. 3, 1987, ch. 618, sec. 8, § 27-1105, 1987 N.Y.
Laws 1078, 1081 (McKinney) (codified at N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 27-1105 (Consol.
1987)). This amendment amounted to an "ungrandfathering" of existing commercial land-
fills, thus subjected them, upon expansion, to siting board certification review. See CECOS
Int'l, 895 F.2d at 68 (stating that under new New York law, CECOS must obtain a siting
certificate and is subject to the siting certification review process).
212. CECOS Int'l, 895 F.2d at 68. The question of whether CECOS actually fell within
a grandfather clause was one that would have been addressed in briefs had the issue
reached that stage of litigation. CECOS claimed that it was grandfathered; the opponents
claimed that it was not. Regardless, the legislative amendment removed any ambiguity
and left CECOS subject to siting certification review. See N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW
§ 27-1105 (Consol. Supp. 1987) (amending N.Y. ENvmL. CONSERV. LAW § 27-1105 (Consol.
1982) (requiring that new landfill facilities, new land disposal facilities, and any expansion
of a land disposal facility receive a certificate of safety from the siting board)).
213. See N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 27-1105 (Consol. 1982) (requiring a certificate
for the construction of a new facility), amended by N.Y. ENvrL. CONSERV. LAW § 27-1105
(1) (Consol. Supp. 1987).
214. N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERv. LAW § 27-1105 (Consol. Supp. 1987).
215. CECOS Int'l, Inc. v. Jorling, 895 F.2d 66, 69 (2d Cir. 1990).
216. Id.
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Further, the failure of CECOS' attempt to build the sixth landfill, a
twenty-two million dollar, 1.2 million cubic yard toxic waste landfill, was
a significant factor when Browning-Ferris, CECOS' parent company, de-
cided to shut down its entire hazardous waste operations.217 Browning-
Ferris announced, one month after the siting decision, that it would dis-
mantle CECOS and leave the toxic waste management business en-
tirely.218 Browning-Ferris now handles only non-hazardous waste and
has moved into the recycling business.2 19 Therefore, one might conclude
that the "ungrandfathering" of the CECOS facility caused Browning-Fer-
ris to leave the hazardous waste management business entirely.
Although for many reasons a total shutdown of a business operation is
not always an ideal result, the CECOS example shows that "un-
grandfathering" is possible, and that it can change the way existing facili-
ties approach environmental management. Ideally, the
"ungrandfathering" of a facility would require that facility, within a rea-
sonable time, to comply with the same stringent environmental standards
applicable to newer facilities. This would raise the level of environmental
regulation and improve environmental quality, especially in the low-in-
come, minority communities currently hosting so many of the existing
polluting facilities.
Nevertheless, some would argue that outright ungrandfathering is po-
litically difficult to achieve because it is a legislative remedy in an arena
where underrepresented groups have difficulty influencing the legislative
process. This is true. But, while politically difficult, the CECOS example
shows that it is not impossible. Any type of legislative change, especially
that which is unattractive to influential lobbies, would require organiza-
tion and a concerted effort on the part of change proponents. 2 °
B. Amortization, Sunset Provisions and Incremental Regulations
Many states have accepted, especially in the land use context, the the-
ory that nonconforming uses can be eliminated from land use zones
217. MacClennan, supra note 203, at B10. Upon the shutdown of the CECOS landfill
in Niagara Falls, N.Y., only one licensed hazardous waste landfill will remain in New York
state. See Cecos Int'l, 895 F.2d at 68 (noting that the CECOS landfill is one of only two
landfills in the state of New York).
218. MacClennan, supra note 203, at B9-B1O.
219. Id.
220. Although CECOS illustrates that ungrandfathering is possible, it also illustrates
that it can have important, though not wholly positive results. The ungrandfathering of the
CECOS facility led to a reduction in capacity for hazardous waste disposal in New York
state. So, while attempting to reduce inequities by eliminating grandfather clauses, change
proponents must be mindful of the consequences and understand that they are making a
choice. See supra note 200 and accompanying text (discussing Preservation of Capacity).
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through an amortization period.2 2 ' Under land use law, for example, an
amortization period would provide the owners of the nonconforming use
an opportunity to make a reasonable return on their investment. It might
also eliminate the potential constitutional takings issues involved with the
immediate elimination of an otherwise lawful nonconforming use.222 For
nonconforming uses, amortization means the elimination of a vested
property right within a certain period of time, as defined by statute or
221. Fred P. Bosselman, The Impact of the Douglas Commission of Local Planning, in
LAND USE INSTITUTE: PLANNING, REGULATION, LITIGATION, EMINENT DOMAIN, AND
COMPENSATION 433, 488 (1993); see Gosin, supra note 163, at 173-174; see also Ackerly
Communications, Inc. v. City of Seattle, 602 P.2d 1177 (Wash. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
804 (1980). Here, the Washington Supreme Court considered the constitutional validity of
a Seattle ordinance which provided a three-year amortization period (with the possibility
of an extension of up to seven years) and required the removal of billboards located within
a specified distance from designated sections of highway. Id. at 1180. The amortization
period was to allow sign owners to recover their investment in the now-violative signs. Id.
at 1181. The ordinance did not call for compensation for the sign owners and the court
held it was not an unconstitutional taking of property without just compensation. Id. at
1184-85. See also John Donnelly & Sons v. Mallar, 453 F. Supp. 1272, 1276 (D. Me. 1978),
rev'd sub nom., John Donnelly & Sons v. Campbell, 639 F.2d 6 (1st Cir. 1980), aff'd, 453
U.S. 916 (1981). Here, the court considered a Maine statute, which included a six-year
amortization provision, and required the removal of nonconforming billboards. The court
failed to rule on the question of a constitutional taking. But see Pennsylvania Northwest-
ern Distrib., Inc. v. Zoning Hearing Bd. of Moon Township, 584 A.2d 1372, 1376 (Pa. 1991)
(holding that "amortization and discontinuance of a lawful pre-existing nonconforming use
is per se confiscatory and violative of the Pennsylvania Constitution"). The Pennsylvania
Supreme Court reached this conclusion, in part, because, "[i]f municipalities were free to
amortize nonconforming uses out of existence, future economic development could be seri-
ously compromised." Id. Further, the court held that amortization used in this way would
amount to a taking without just compensation. Id.
222. Gosin, supra note 163, at 175. The Clean Water Act also includes amortization
provisions. The Clean Water Act provides that a more stringent standard of performance
may not be imposed on an individual source for ten years after completion of construction
or until the facility is fully depreciated or amortized, whichever is earlier. 33 U.S.C.
§ 1316(d) (1988). Some have inferred from Congress' special treatment of new sources in
this context that it intended to afford protection to new sources without extending the
same protection to existing sources or restricting the effectiveness of the § 1316(d) stan-
dards, even upon new sources. See American Frozen Food Inst. v. Train, 539 F.2d 107, 116
(D.C. Cir. 1976) (noting that the exceptions in the Federal Water Pollution Control Act
function as amortization provisions, in that they diminish the economic disruption caused
by the implementation of the Act); Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Environ-
mental Protection Agency, 822 F.2d 104, 115 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (stating that, under 33 U.S.C.
§ 1316(d), new sources have a ten-year amortization period to conform to more stringent
standards); see also Town of Islip v. Zalak, 566 N.Y.S.2d 306, 313 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991)
(holding that defendant's claim that local laws governing the operation of solid waste
transfer stations were "invalid because they fail[ed] to provide for a reasonable amortiza-
tion period [was] not ripe for judicial review").
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regulation, so that the land use in a particular location eventually comes
into compliance with the current zoning law. 2 3
In addition to their use in the land use context, amortization provisions
have appeared in other areas of law as well.224 They could certainly be
used in areas of environmental law other than land use and zoning.225 In
fact, in addition to their use in environmental legislation and regulation,
amortization provisions have been used in environmental permitting.
This means that a facility operating under a permit must meet increas-
ingly stringent standards over a predetermined schedule.
In the legislative context, just as citizens have pushed to "un-
grandfather" facilities, they could push legislators to create amortization
provisions in existing statutes or regulations. Amortization periods,
whether in legislation, regulation, or permits, would allow existing facili-
ties to continue to operate under lower standards of environmental regu-
lation for a limited regulated duration. Facilities would be required to
comply, eventually, with the more stringent standards applicable to newer
facilities. Investors should have time to recoup their investment, and use
the amortization period to find ways to remain profitable under the new
system of regulation.
Slightly different from, but related to amortization, would be a form of
incremental regulation requiring facilities to meet more stringent stan-
dards over time. The only real difference between amortization and in-
cremental regulation is that the express purpose of amortization is to
allow for recoupment of investment. While amortization provisions may
use incremental systems of regulation to allow recoupment of investment,
223. Gosin, supra note 163, at 164. Although many states have accepted the theory that
an amortization period provides a solution to the "problem" of nonconforming uses, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court determined that amortization of nonconforming uses consti-
tuted a taking of property without just compensation, in violation of the Pennsylvania Con-
stitution. Pennsylvania Northwestern Distrib., 584 A.2d at 1376.
224. See, e.g., Highway Beautification Act of 1965, 23 U.S.C. § 131(d)(1988) (creating
an amortization technique to phaseout billboards on highways).
225. See, e.g., Stepan Co. v. Pollution Control Bd., 550 N.E.2d 682, 683 (III. App. Ct.
1990) in which an Illinois appellate court interpreted an Illinois Administrative Code rule
"providing that existing facilities with combustion devices to control process [volatile or-
ganic material] emissions do not have to meet the [new] 98% limit until the combustion
device is replaced." This rule provides a stringent standard for the control of volatile or-
ganic materials, but does not make it immediately applicable to all facilities. Id. Signifi-
cantly, however, it also does not provide a lifetime exemption for existing facilities. It
provides a grandfather clause which allows existing facilities to continue to operate at
lower control levels until the pollution control equipment at issue is in need of replace-
ment, at which time the facility becomes responsible for meeting the new, more stringent
control requirements. Id. This type of grandfather clause, which includes an identifiable
end point for the exemption is the type of provision which, if universal, would help im-
prove the environment in a way that is fair to existing facilities.
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they may also simply set a future date for compliance, effectively creating
a sunset provision and an end date for protected status.2 26 In a pure in-
cremental regulation scheme, regulations might require facilities to meet
increasingly stringent regulation over a prescribed set of deadlines, ulti-
mately resulting in full compliance with the standards applicable to new
facilities.
Related to amortization provisions and incremental regulation are sun-
set provisions, which could provide another opportunity for legislators
and regulators to amend the current rules in a way that positively deals
with the problem of environmental grandfather clauses. Rather than cre-
ating friendly periods of incremental regulation, lawmakers could create
sunset provisions for existing and future grandfather clauses. Sunset pro-
visions would provide that older polluting facilities are subject to the
older, less stringent standards until a predetermined future date. This
method allows legislators and regulators to continue to use grandfather
clauses in a positive way that is fair to investors, but provides an end date
to the preferential treatment. In other words, sunset provisions allow leg-
islators to reap the benefits provided by grandfather clauses while provid-
ing for a more equitable regulatory scheme over time. With the addition
of sunset provisions, grandfather clauses provide only a temporally lim-
ited protection for regulated industry, thus minimizing the negative im-
pact and inequity of eternal grandfathered protections.
C. A Word on Potential Criticism
The solutions proposed in this Article may be subject to criticism on
several counts. First, they are legislative solutions in an area where legis-
lation, in the form of grandfather clauses, is the problem. If under-
represented groups were not strong enough to prevent the creation of
environmental grandfather clauses in the first place, some will argue that
they will not be able to win legislative solutions. Second, some may argue
that the proposed solutions invite a takings challenge because they im-
pose increased regulation that may, financially, force some facilities to
close and thus depriving the owner of her property without just compen-
226. For example, in the Oil Pollution Prevention, Response, Liability and Compensa-
tion Act of 1990, Congress required virtually all oil tankers operating in U.S. waters to be
equipped with double hulls. The regulations implementing that requirement phases-in the
double-hull requirement for existing tankers over a 20 year period, according to the age
and size of the ship. 33 C.F.R. Part 167, App. G. The phase-in requirement began on
January 1, 1995 for the oldest, largest ships, and is deferred for a period of time depending
on size and age to as late as January 1, 2005. Id.
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sation.22 Third, some may argue that better solutions exist through liti-
gation or in the permitting process.
As illustrated by the CECOS example, outright ungrandfathering is
possible. It may not be the easiest solution to implement, but it is achiev-
able. Even underrepresented groups should be able to organize around
the idea of eliminating a grandfathered benefit and succeed in changing
the legislation that created the benefit.
Although they are legislative solutions, amortization provisions, incre-
mental regulation and sunset provisions address one important potential
criticism. Where some potential remedies to the problem of grandfather-
ing invite a takings challenge, these solutions may help prevent one.
These legislative remedies make a successful takings challenge less likely
because they provide investors with substantial notice of impending
changes in regulations, and allow investors ample time to recoup poten-
tial losses. Whether this would actually withstand a takings challenge
would be a fact specific question. But, the nature of these remedies make
them more likely to withstand such a challenge than an immediate in-
crease in the stringency of environmental regulation.
Some will argue that better solutions exist through the administrative
and permitting processes. These processes may indeed offer many ac-
ceptable solutions. Regardless, the legislative solutions offered in this
Article provide workable, positive options for environmental justice ad-
vocates and others to consider in their attempts to remedy the inequities
created by environmental grandfather clauses.
V. CONCLUSIONS: "GRANDFATHER, THAT'S NOT FAIR"; AND A NEW
Focus FOR ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE ADVOCATES
In some circumstances, the principles of fairness, equity and justice
support the creation of grandfather clauses. They do not, however, dic-
tate that their protections be eternal. To create a system in which the
positive, equity-enhancing characteristics of environmental grandfather
clauses exist, but are not masked by the inequity created when they are
allowed to continue indefinitely, this Article made several suggestions for
the reduction or elimination of grandfathered benefits over time. If im-
plemented, these suggestions should help reduce inequity both generally
in the regulation of polluting facilities and as applied to low-income, mi-
nority communities.
To begin reducing the inequities caused by environmental grandfather
clauses, environmental justice advocates should heed the lessons that
227. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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CECOS teaches-that it is possible to "ungrandfather" a facility, and
that upon "ungrandfathering," a facility may be shut down for its inability
to meet the applicable environmental standards. Or ideally, the "un-
grandfathered" facility would arrange to meet the more stringent stan-
dards applicable to its newer counterparts. Although it is clearly not
simple to "ungrandfather" a facility, it is worthwhile to exert some effort
and focus on a process that could help balance the regulation applied to
similar facilities of various ages, and at the same time, improve the ex-
isting environment in low-income, minority communities.
If a facility cannot be outright "ungrandfathered," environmental jus-
tice advocates might push to create amortization provisions which would
require facilities to comply, within a reasonable, legislatively determined
time, with the stringent environmental standards applicable to new facili-
ties, thereby allowing investors an opportunity to protect their invest-
ment. Congress and other legislative and administrative bodies could
phase out the grandfather clauses that protect older facilities from tough
regulatory requirements by using an incremental regulatory scheme
under which existing facilities must meet incrementally more stringent
standards over time.228 Legislators and rulemakers could create sunset
provisions, under which a facility's grandfathered status would expire on
a predetermined date. Upon expiration of the facility's grandfathered
status, the facility would be required to comply with environmental regu-
lation applicable to new facilities.
Amortization provisions, incremental regulation or sunset provisions
would allow the use of protective grandfather clauses in a way that is fair
to current and future investors, while not allowing protection and prefer-
ential treatment to continue indefinitely. As such, these provisions could
work towards establishing equity, or at least reducing inequity, racial,
demographic and general, created by environmental grandfather clauses.
But, regardless of which approach they choose, environmental justice ad-
vocates should expand their focus.
The current, almost single-minded attention placed on blocking the
construction or siting of new polluting facilities in low-income minority
communities is of seriously limited utility. There are relatively few new
facilities being built, and they are subject to the most stringent environ-
mental regulation available. Because environmental justice advocates
seek to improve the environmental quality in low-income minority com-
munities, they should devote attention to the existing facilities currently
located in and polluting the low-income minority communities they seek
228. See James Gustave Speth et al.,... And Going For the Gold, A National Strategy
For Helping America Clean Up By Cleaning Up, WASH. POST, Oct. 4,1992, at C3.
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to serve. They should focus on the environmental grandfather clauses
that allow those facilities to continue operating under less stringent envi-
ronmental standards.
The suggested solutions and remedies in this Article, outright "un-
grandfathering", amortization provisions, incremental regulation and
sunset provisions would allow the principles of fairness, equity and justice
to protect the interests of existing facility owners and investors while im-
proving the environmental quality of the low-income communities that
currently bear a disproportionate burden of environmental risk. Under-
standing that this disproportionate burden of environmental risk cur-
rently borne by low-income communities is due, at least in part, to the
continued existence of environmental grandfather clauses, it would serve
the environmental justice movement well to take a close look at environ-
mental grandfather clauses and attempt to reduce or eliminate the bene-
fits they confer on older polluting facilities.

